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GOING THE WAY OF THE DODO:  
DE-EXTINCTION, DUALISMS, AND REFRAMING 
CONSERVATION 
ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO
 
ABSTRACT 
De-extinction, a suite of selective breeding or biotechnological 
processes for reviving and releasing into the environment members or 
facsimiles of an extinct species, has been the subject of a recent surge of 
analysis in popular, scientific, and legal literature. Yet de-extinction raises 
more fundamental questions about the relationship between humans and 
nature and about the more and less useful ways that the law serves to 
navigate that relationship. Unfortunately, the endangered species, 
invasive species, and public land management laws likely to govern the 
revival and introduction of de-extinct species largely remain premised on 
an understanding of nature as static and easily divisible from human 
activity. In these contexts, the law habitually privileges and even actively 
promotes what it identifies as natural and native over the unnatural and 
exotic.  
Through the example of de-extinction, this article illustrates the 
limitations of the law’s reliance on these crude dualisms. Currently, de-
extinct species will often be obstructed as non-native and introduced (even 
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if they might promote ecological function in a particular area) and may be 
allowed or promoted in locations they used to exist (even if likely to cause 
ecological damage). De-extinction illustrates how policymakers need to 
reformulate natural resources law to be less dependent on these strict 
dualities. Instead, the article argues in favor of cautious risk assessment 
that acknowledges the dynamism of nature and humanity’s indivisibility 
from it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Dodo (Raphus cucullatus), that object of the leading idiom about 
permanent obsolescence,
1
 might not be gone.
2
 In 1598, at the behest of 
Dutch Vice-Admiral Wybrandt Warwijck, who had rediscovered the 
island of Mauritius and claimed it for the Netherlands,
3
 Heyndrick Dircksz 
Jolinck led an expedition to reconnoiter the island during which he 
encountered what became known as the Dodo.
4
 Flightless and fearless, the 
Dodo was driven to extinction by about 1698, likely a victim of the 
combined onslaught of human hunting, habitat loss, and invasive rats, 
pigs, goats, dogs, and cats.
5
 There is no reason to assume that the Dodo—
now known to have been, in evolutionary terms, essentially a giant, 
flightless pigeon
6—any less well adapted to the ecosystems it inhabited 
than any other species indigenous to Mauritius.
7
 Nevertheless, it has 
become a potent symbol of silliness and futility.
8
  
 
 
 1.  To “go the way of the dodo” commonly means to become extinct or obsolete, to fall out of 
common usage or practice, or to become a thing of the past. See ERROL FULLER, DODO: FROM 
EXTINCTION TO ICON 13 (2002). 
 2. The Dodo may soon be a target for de-extinction. Scientists Want to Bring 24 Animals Back 
from Extinction (Dodos Make the List . . . but Dinosaur DNA Is So Old, Jurassic Park Isn’t an 
Option), MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2013, 8:58 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2298805/Scientists-want-bring-24-animals-extinction-Dodos-make-list--dinosaur-DNA-old-Jurassic-
Park-isnt-option.html, archived at perma.cc/VPZ2-CEYW. 
 3. Julian P. Hume, The History of the Dodo Raphus Cucullatus and the Penguin of Mauritius, 
18 HIST. BIOLOGY 65, 67 (2006). It appears that Mauritius had been visited earlier by Arab sailors and 
even settled briefly by the Portuguese in the early 16th Century. Id. at 66. However, it was uninhabited 
by humans when the Dutch first arrived. Id. 
 4. See P.J. MOREE, A CONCISE HISTORY OF DUTCH MAURITIUS, 1598–1710, at 12 (Paul van der 
Velde et al. eds., 1998) (“[W]e also found large birds, with wings as large as of a pigeon, so that they 
could not fly and were named penguins by the Portuguese. These particular birds have a stomach so 
large that it could provide two men with a tasty meal and was actually the most delicious part of the 
bird.”). 
 5. See JOLYON C. PARISH, THE DODO AND THE SOLITAIRE: A NATURAL HISTORY 50 (2013) 
(stating that “[b]y 1698 no dodos were to be seen”) (internal citations omitted). 
 6. Beth Shapiro et al., Flight of the Dodo, 295 SCIENCE 1683, 1683 (2002) (concluding based 
on genetic analysis that the dodo belongs to the pigeon family, despite substantial morphological 
differences). 
 7. E.g., FULLER, supra note 1, at 25; Dodo Bird a Resilient Island Survivor Before the Arrival of 
Humans, Study Reveals, SMITHSONIAN SCI. (Sept. 26, 2011), http://smithsonianscience.org/2011/ 
09/dodo-bird-was-a-resilient-island-survivor-before-the-arrival-of-humans/, archived at perma.cc/ 
C9SB-QVED; Theory of Evolution: Extinction, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/ 
science/21c_pre_2011/evolution/theoryevolutionrev8.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), archived at 
perma.cc/B9BF-KWM7. 
 8. Contemporaneous verbal accounts and pictorial representations clearly indicate that the Dodo 
was viewed as awkward, silly, and rather pathetic. With its oddly proportioned body that appeared to 
be a concatenation of parts, its unnatural appearance inspired English explorer Peter Mundy to 
speculate about whether it had arisen “by Mixture off kindes producing straunge and Monstrous 
formes.” Hume, supra note 3, at 68 (citing 5 PETER MUNDY, THE TRAVELS OF PETER MUNDY IN 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Yet “going the way of the Dodo” may soon take on new meaning. 
Though until now a symbol of permanent extermination, emerging 
technologies of de-extinction may make the Dodo the ultimate example of 
the inevitably dynamic character of ecological phenomena and the 
inextricable relationship of humans with nature. Unfortunately, the various 
conservation laws likely to govern the revival and introduction of the 
Dodo largely remain premised on outdated assumptions of nature as static 
and firmly divisible from human activity.  
While established legal dualisms such as native versus alien or natural 
versus introduced may offer a clear organizing principle, strict adherence 
may ignore nuances and complexities.
9
 More crucially, legal dualisms 
based on erroneous premises—such as a nature that is (and should be) 
unchanging and divisible from humanity—likely will result in distorted or 
harmful policy outcomes.
10
 Just as aphorists may be forced to reconsider a 
common adage, and scientists obliged to reevaluate the permanency of 
extinction, de-extinction illustrates how policymakers need to reformulate 
legal frameworks governing natural resources to be less dependent on 
simplistic dualisms in favor of cautious risk assessment that recognizes the 
dynamism of nature and humanity’s indivisibility from it. 
De-extinction is the process of reviving members or facsimiles of an 
extinct species through a variety of selective breeding or biotechnological 
methods, as well as the release of such organisms into existing ecological 
systems.
11
 Functional de-extinction would not involve genetic engineering 
but rather selectively breeding organisms exhibiting the phenotypic or 
functional characteristics of extinct target organisms with the intent of 
aggregating those desired characteristics into individual organisms over 
several generations.
12
 More controversially, de-extinction via genetic 
 
 
EUROPE AND ASIA 353 (Richard C. Temple ed., 1914)). Even the etymology of the name “Dodo” 
foreshadowed its fate. Derived, as it probably was, from the word “doudo,” Portuguese for simpleton 
or fool, the description “Dodo” has come to be understood as a synonym for stupid. Dodo Definition, 
OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/56392 (last visited July 29, 
2014). 
 9. See infra notes 202–06 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
564–71 (2000); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976). 
 11. Norman F. Carlin et al., How to Permit Your Mammoth: Some Legal Implications of “De-
Extinction”, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7–17 (2013). 
 12. For example, it might be possible to breed cattle in a conventional manner to recapture some 
of the characteristics and functions of aurochs. The fruits of such a breeding program would not be 
aurochs per se, but ecologically functional approximations of aurochs. The Tauros Programme: The 
Search for a New Icon for European Wilderness, STICHTING TAURUS, http://www.taurosproject.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/5
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engineering
13
 would include a suite of technologies in which the DNA 
segments from extinct and extant species are combined to make a new 
“recombinant” DNA.14 For example, efforts to construct a viable Dodo 
might rely on inserting preserved fragments of Dodo genomic DNA into 
its closest living relative, an existing, complete Nicobar pigeon (Caloenas 
nicobarica) genome.
15
 The result would be a genomic hybrid 
Dodo/Nicobar pigeon. Through multiple generations of such a process, 
DNA from extinct target species would make up increasing proportions of 
genomes of de-extinct individuals—eventually resulting in the genomes of 
de-extinct species being derived entirely, and with high fidelity, from the 
genomes of their extinct relatives.  
The possibility of “bringing back” extinct species like the Dodo has 
been the subject of a recent outpouring of discussion in popular
16
 and 
 
 
 13. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL G:15 (5th ed. 2008) (defining 
genetic engineering (or recombinant DNA technology) as a “[c]ollection of techniques by which DNA 
segments from different sources are combined to make a new DNA, often called a recombinant 
DNA”). 
 14. See Carlin et al., supra note 11, at 11–13 (describing de-extinction through genetic 
engineering). 
 15. Beth Shapiro & Michael Hofreiter, A Paleogenomic Perspective on Evolution and Gene 
Function: New Insights from Ancient DNA, 343 SCIENCE 1236573, 1236573–75 (2014). 
 16. E.g., Dominic Basulto, De-Extinction Is the Mind-Blowing Idea of the Year, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 19, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/de-extinction-is-
the-mind-blowing-idea-of-the-year/2013/03/19/cbbce3b8-908e-11e2-9173-7f87cda73b49_blog.html, 
archived at perma.cc/3953-Z5H5; Stewart Brand, Back From the Brink: Should We Use Cloning to 
Save Endangered Species?, SLATE (June 4, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
technology/future_tense/2014/06/cloning_wildlife_carrie_friese_s_book_on_using_tech_to_save_enda
ngered_species.html, archived at perma.cc/K8YZ-E7WX; Virginia Gewin, Laws Lag Behind Science 
in De-Extinction Debate, DISCOVER (June 5, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/ 
crux/2013/06/05/laws-lag-behind-science-in-de-extinction-debate/#.VAjjFleNauT, archived at perma. 
cc/5HXT-RXGB; Liza Gross, De-Extinction Debate: Should Extinct Species Be Revived?, KQED 
(June 5, 2013), http://blogs.kqed.org/science/2013/06/05/deextinction-debate-should-extinct-species-
be-revived/, archived at perma.cc/JV6W-VBCM; Gina Kolata, So You’re Extinct? Scientists Have 
Gleam in Eye, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/science/earth/ 
research-to-bring-back-extinct-frog-points-to-new-path-and-quandaries.html?_r=0, archived at perma. 
cc/DSJ4-A8V5; Lisa M. Krieger, Extinct Species Revival Raises Hopes, Fears, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS (May 31, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci_23365591/reviving-extinct-
species-raises-hopes-and-fears, archived at perma.cc/9P7B; Jackson Landers, Can Scientists Bring 
Mammoths Back to Life by Cloning?, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/national/health-science/can-scientists-bring-mammoths-back-to-life-by-cloning/2015/02/06/2a82 
5c8c-80ae-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html; Tanya Lewis, De-Extinction Experts See Benefits in 
Resurrecting Extinct Animals, but Critics Abound, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013, 9:05 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/26/de-extinction-extinct-animals-life_n_3816271.html, archived 
at perma.cc/LLL5-9A6H; Frank Swain, Don’t Bring Back the Saber-Toothed Tiger: How De-
Extinction Could Derail the Conservation Movement, SLATE (Mar. 18, 2013, 1:58 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2013/03/de_extinction_isn_t_a_good_idea. 
html, archived at perma.cc/76F8-WCNC; John Roach, Back from the Dead: Why De-Extinction May 
Save Humanity, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/back-
dead-why-de-extinction-may-save-humanity-n164226; Andy Roast, De-Extinction: Mammoth 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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scientific
17
 literature, and a number of active initatives are under way to 
revive facsimiles of the extinct passenger pigeon,
18
 bucardo,
19
 gastric 
brooding frog,
20
 woolly mammoth,
21
 and auroch.
22
 Even legal scholarship 
recently has touched on the applicability of certain laws to the revival of a 
de-extinct species.
23
 Yet de-extinction raises more fundamental questions 
about the relationship between humans and nature,
24
 and the more and less 
useful ways that the law serves to navigate that relationship.  
Unfortunately, resource conservation laws are replete with dualisms as 
awkward and unsustainable as the stereotypical Dodo.
25
 How the law may 
 
 
Prospect, or Just Woolly?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2013, 7:31 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-
environment-23602142, archived at perma.cc/NPT4-NFVK; Adam Welz, De-Extinction Critics at 
Scientific American Have Missed the Point, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 11:18 AM), http://www. 
theguardian.com/environment/nature-up/2013/jun/07/deextinction-critics-scientific-american, archived 
at perma.cc/V5NY-OO7S; Carl Zimmer, Bringing Them Back to Life, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Apr. 2013, 
available at http://ngm. nationalgeographic.com/2013/04/125-species-revival/zimmer-text, archived at 
perma.cc/U63N-JC4N. 
 17. E.g., C. Josh Donlan, De-Extinction in a Crisis Discipline, 6 FRONTIERS BIOGEOGRAPHY 25 
(2014); Lesley Evans Ogden, Extinction Is Forever . . . Or Is It?, 64 BIOSCIENCE 469 (2014); Matthew 
J. Heard, De-Extinction: Raising the Dead and a Number of Important Questions, 6 FRONTIERS 
BIOGEOGRAPHY 1 (2014); AMY LYNN FLETCHER, MENDEL'S ARK: BIOTECHNOLOGY & THE FUTURE 
OF EXTINCTION (2014); Carrie Friese & Claire Marris, Making De-Extinction Mundane?, PLOS 
BIOLOGY, Mar. 2014, at 1; Nader Heidari, Reviving the Dead, 91 CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS 34 (2013), 
available at http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/i14/Reviving-Dead.html; Kate Jones, From Dinosaurs to 
Dodos: Who Could and Should We De-Extinct?, 6 FRONTIERS BIOGEOGRAPHY 20 (2014); Dolly 
Jørgensen, Reintroduction and De-Extinction, 63 BIOSCIENCE 719 (2013); Ronald Sandler, The Ethics 
of Reviving Long Extinct Species, 28 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 354 (2013); Jacob S. Sherkow & 
Henry T. Greely, What If Extinction Is Not Forever?, 340 SCIENCE 32 (2013); Philip J. Seddon et al., 
Reintroducing Resurrected Species: Selecting DeExtinction Candidates, 29 TRENDS ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 140 (2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2014.01.007. 
 18. See David Biello, Ancient DNA Could Return Passenger Pigeons to the Sky, SCI. AM. (Aug. 
29, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ancient-dna-could-return-passenger-pigeons-to-
the-sky, archived at perma.cc/U2AE-CYDT; Todd McGrain, Can Science Bring Back the Passenger 
Pigeon?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2014, 7:50 PM), http://wsj.com/articles/todd-mcgrain-can-science-
bring-back-the-passenger-pigeon-1409269840. 
 19. See Kai Kupferschmidt, Can Cloning Revive Spain's Extinct Mountain Goat?, 344 SCIENCE 
137 (2014). 
 20. See Nicky Phillips, Extinct Frog Hops Back into the Gene Pool, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/animals/extinct-frog-hops-back-into-the-gene-
pool-20130315-2g68x.html. 
 21. See Jason Koebler, The Plan to Turn Elephants into Woolly Mammoths is Already Underway, 
MOTHERBOARD (May 21, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/read/the-plan-to-turn-
elephants-into-woolly-mammoths-is-already-underway. 
 22. See Stephan Faris, Breeding Ancient Cattle Back from Extinction, TIME, Feb. 12, 2010, 
available at http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1961918,00.html. 
 23. See Carlin et al., supra note 11. 
 24. See Sandler, supra note 17, at 354; THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL RE-CREATION AND 
MODIFICATION: REVIVING, REWILDING, RESTORING (Markku Oksanen & Helena Siipi eds., 2014). 
 25. Cf. Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2002) (analyzing and rejecting reliance on a rigid nature/human legal 
dualism in interpreting the Antiquities Act, Endangered Species Act, and Wilderness Act). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/5
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relate to de-extinction brings the limitations of these dichotomies into high 
relief. These simplistic and problematic dualisms include divisions 
between those phenomena deemed natural and those considered artificial 
or unnatural, as well as between the native and the exotic. In a variety of 
different regulatory programs, the law habitually privileges and even 
actively promotes what it identifies as natural and native over the 
unnatural and exotic.  
De-extinction illustrates the limitations of the law’s reliance on these 
simplistic dichotomies. Existing endangered species, invasive species, and 
public land laws and policies as applied to the revival of extinct species 
demonstrate the problems with a primarily dualistic approach to managing 
dynamic natural systems. Endangered species laws focus on protecting de-
extinct species primarily where they used to be, not where they may 
promote ecological function now and in the future; other wildlife laws 
might perversely allow introduction of a de-extinct species where it is 
incompatible with an area’s current conditions but bar it in circumstances 
where it could provide substantial ecological benefits. The effectiveness 
and coherence of laws in each of these doctrinal areas have been 
undermined by the privileges (and even stimuli) accorded to just one side 
of a dualistic pair.  
Accordingly, this Article offers an alternative approach that provides 
for a more appropriate assessment and adaptive management of the 
benefits and risks of de-extinction and other human manipulations of, or 
intervention in, ecology. I do not suggest that differently situated species 
or organisms should be treated equivalently. To the contrary, there may be 
circumstances in which it is valuable to privilege certain types of species 
over others. In particular, there may be important reasons to build into the 
legal framework a rebuttable presumption that a species or organism that 
already exists in a particular ecological niche is valuable and less risky. In 
contrast, the potential arrival of a new species or organism to a preexisting 
ecological community may be reasonably presumed to be less valuable 
and raise unknown risks. Other circumstances may not justify such initial 
presumptions and instead would default to full and particularized risk 
assessments. The article submits that either a case-by-case risk assessment 
or a default rebuttable presumption is more likely to lead to sound and 
justifiable legal and policy decisions than a simplistic reliance on dualisms 
that treats preexisting biota as categorical virtues and new arrivals—
particularly those involving human intervention—as vices. 
The article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief summation of 
the potential ecological benefits and risks of reviving, as well as 
introducing, de-extinct organisms. Parts II and III engage in a detailed 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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exploration of the ways in which the emphasis on dualisms in natural 
resources law largely fails to integrate a clear and coherent methodology 
for parsing through these various risks and benefits. Part II examines 
endangered species preservation laws, which largely focus on protecting 
historically present species in pre-existing environments while ignoring 
the inevitability of dynamic change in ecological systems and the 
unavoidable influence of humans in these areas. Similarly, Part III 
explores how invasive species and other wildlife management laws seek to 
resist species’ movement, especially human-aided movement, while 
promoting previously present biota and ecological inertia as 
incontrovertible assets. Part IV then explains how de-extinction reveals the 
flaws in legal categories grounded in erroneous conceptions of nature as 
static and detached from human activity. Finally, it proposes a provisional 
risk-based adaptive management framework more likely to lead to sensible 
assessments of the risks and benefits of novel conservation strategies.  
I. THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS AND BENEFITS OF DE-EXTINCTION 
The availability of de-extinction technologies does not only provide the 
possibility for reviving extinct species in a laboratory setting. At least 
according to de-extinction proponents, the process of de-extinction may 
not end with the successful revival of a single organism or population of 
organisms ex situ.
26
 De-extinction may—and some would argue should—
include the eventual introduction of recovered populations into existing 
biotic communities.
27
 Such efforts may have ecological benefits, but they 
also raise potentially significant risks. 
A. Potential Ecological Benefits of De-Extinction 
There is a range of possible benefits from engaging in de-extinction for 
efforts to conserve existing ecological resources. The revival and 
introduction of members of a de-extinct species could serve to directly 
improve the integrity and function for ecosystems that have declined due 
to the loss of the constituent species. This would be particularly beneficial 
for recently extinct species (such as a keystone species
28
) that had 
 
 
 26. Seddon et al., supra note 17, at 140. 
 27. Id. 
 28. The loss of a keystone species from an ecosystem can create significant ecological 
disruptions. See L. Scott Mills, Michael E. Soulé & Daniel F. Doak, The Keystone-Species Concept in 
Ecology and Conservation, 43 BIOSCIENCE 219, 219 (1993) (arguing that the term keystone species “is 
broadly applied, poorly defined, and nonspecific in meaning,” but nonetheless delineating “two 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/5
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occupied an important ecological niche that remains unfilled since the 
extirpation of the species. As with reintroduction efforts of extant 
endangered species,
29
 a strategic introduction of members of a revived 
species could provide benefits not only for the introduced species but also 
other components of the ecological community.
30
 In this sense, the 
introduction of revived species into the habitat of which it previously was 
a constituent might be considered a form of (or at least analogous to) re-
wilding or restoration ecology.
31
 
In addition, a number of proponents of de-extinction contend that 
technologies developed in the pursuit of de-extinction may have 
considerable co-benefits for efforts to recover critically endangered 
populations. Advances in knowledge achieved through cloning efforts for 
extinct species could be used to engage in cloning for extant endangered 
species, particularly for species that have declined to only a few or single 
non-reproducing individuals.
32
 Furthermore, technological advances in 
genetic manipulation achieved through de-extinction efforts—such as the 
use of cryopreserved gametes
33
 (or even ancient DNA from preserved 
 
 
hallmarks of keystone species. First, their presence is crucial in maintaining the organization and 
diversity of their ecological communities. Second, it is implicit that these species are exceptional, 
relative to the rest of the community, in their importance.”). 
 29. See Sherkow & Greely, supra note 17, at 33 (suggesting that re-wilding with existing species, 
locally extinct in certain habitats, can help restore extinct or threatened ecosystems). Such ecological 
benefits may be direct or indirect. See, e.g., Welz, supra note 16 (explaining how re-wilding the 
California condor shed light on lead poisoning, thus resulting in lead reduction efforts in Arizona and 
calls to ban the use of lead bullets in California); but cf. Seddon et al., supra note 17, at 141 
(referencing existing guidelines for extant species “on the justification, design, and implementation of 
any conservation translocation” that can provide a starting point for selecting de-extinction 
candidates).  
 30. Some suggest, for example, that the woolly mammoth as a grazing species in the Arctic may 
help return the grassy steppes to the now “less ecologically rich tundra,” and reintroducing extinct 
plants could result in pharmaceutical advancements. Sherkow & Greely, supra note 17, at 33. On the 
other hand, the longer the species has been absent from the community, the greater the risk that its 
return could, much like an invasive species, have a negative impact on a community that has moved on 
and established a new dynamic equilibrium. See Julian Savulescu & Russell Powell, Mammoth 
Cloning: The Ethics, THE CONVERSATION (July 24, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://theconversation.com/ 
mammoth-cloning-the-ethics-16183 (discussing the issue of habitat disruption), archived at 
perma.cc/U6W6-ARQZ. 
 31. See, e.g., Josh Donlan et al., Re-Wilding North America, 436 NATURE 913, 913–14 (2005) 
(advocating “the restoration of large wild vertebrates into North America” through “a series of 
carefully managed ecosystem manipulations using closely related species as proxies for extinct large 
vertebrates”). 
 32. See Ferris Jabr, Will Cloning Ever Save Endangered Animals?, SCI. AM. (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cloning-endangered-animals, archived at perma.cc/8DWX-
FUDP. 
 33. See Jonathan D. Ballou, Potential Contribution of Cryopreserved Germ Plasm to the 
Preservation of Genetic Diversity and Conservation of Endangered Species in Captivity, 29 
CRYOBIOLOGY 19 (1992). 
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materials) to obtain and introduce new beneficial alleles into an existing 
population—might be useful if employed to increase the genetic diversity 
of existing endangered species populations or to engage in “genetic 
rescue” for endangered species that are genetically depauperate.34 Genetic-
engineering technologies might also be used to insert new genes into the 
genome of a vulnerable species to enhance its fitness in the face of threats 
such as introduced pathogens or parasites.
35
 
Finally, some also suggest that successful de-extinction of a species 
may serve to awaken interest in, and even action on behalf of, ecological 
conservation by providing a concrete illustration of the capacity of humans 
to shape and repair past and ongoing anthropogenic damage to 
ecosystems.
36
 These proponents of de-extinction argue that the 
reconstruction of previously extinct species will help the public realize 
that humans indeed can shape their environment, and such influence may 
be galvanized to actively try to develop solutions that cultivate ecological 
health.
37
 De-extinction’s use as an example of the capacity for ecological 
manipulation is thus posited as a way to combat resignation in some 
quarters that humans are incapable of mending past and continuing harm 
to ecological resources.
38
 
B. Potential Conservation Risks of De-Extinction 
On the other hand, de-extinction efforts raise several costs, and 
potentially significant risks, for existing biotic communities and 
conservation efforts in general. The most obvious costs are the direct 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Philip W. Hedrick & Richard J. Fredrickson, Genetic Rescue Guidelines with 
Examples from Mexican Wolves and Florida Panthers, 11 CONSERVATION GENETICS 615 (2010). 
 35. See, e.g., Katherine F. Smith et al., Evidence for the Role of Infectious Disease in Species 
Extinction and Endangerment, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1349 (2006); Jonathan M. Adams et al., 
The Case for Genetic Engineering of Native and Landscape Trees against Introduced Pests and 
Diseases, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 874 (2002). For example, researchers announced in November 
2014 that they have successfully altered the genome of the American chestnut to increase blight 
resistance to the introduced pathogenic fungus Cryphonectria parasitica. See Andrew E. Newhouse, et 
al., Transgenic American Chestnuts Show Enhanced Blight Resistance and Transmit the Trait to T1 
Progeny, 228 PLANT SCI. 88 (2014). 
 36. See Sandler, supra note 17, at 3. 
 37. See Welz, supra note 16 (“People are strongly drawn to miraculous stories of resurrection 
(Jesus of Nazareth has quite a few fans) and de-extinction could, if framed and conducted correctly, 
bring new awareness to extinction and habitat protection.”); Seddon et al., supra note 17, at 140 (“The 
prospect of being able to resurrect extinct species captures the imagination of many scientists and the 
general public alike.”). 
 38. But see Sandler, supra note 17, at 355–56 (arguing that appropriate methods of mending past 
harm should be forward-looking and seek to minimize future extinctions, and as such de-extinction can 
be detrimental). 
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economic expenses of managing the laboratory revival and subsequent 
introduction effort. A number of scientists have identified the considerable 
administrative expenditures from active reintroduction interventions for 
existing species.
39
 Beyond the substantial outlay for captive breeding 
efforts,
40
 monitoring and adaptive management sufficient to support 
successful introduction and minimize negative effects on the receiving 
area will often be extensive and possibly decades long.
41
  
The direct costs of captive breeding and introduction efforts for revived 
species are likely to be at least as high as those for the translocation of 
existing species. The expense of developing yet unproven de-extinction 
technologies to cultivate a viable organism and breed a population are 
likely to be significant.
42
 Additional costs include those incurred for 
planning, implementation, and long-term monitoring of introductions, 
including the costs of any initial failures to establish a de-extinct species 
(though empirical assessments of the likelihood of successfully 
establishing an introduced population vary).
43
 
Perhaps of even greater concern are the potential risks of harm from the 
introduction of organisms to existing ecological systems of which these 
organisms have either never been a constituent or from which they have 
been absent for a substantial period of time. Rather than contributing 
ecological benefits, then, such introductions may serve to erode 
biodiversity, disrupt ecosystems, and contribute to extinctions at receiving 
sites.
44
 These risks mirror concerns raised in response to proposals for 
assisted migration—non-native, planned introductions to facilitate species 
 
 
 39. Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework for Debate of Assisted Migration in an Era of 
Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 297, 299–300 (2007) 
 40. See Noel F.R. Snyder et al., Limitations of Captive Breeding in Endangered Species 
Recovery, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 338, 343-44 (1996) (“The costs of captive breeding programs 
for recovery of endangered species sometimes run on the order of a half-million dollars per year per 
species”). 
 41. See McLachlan et al., supra note 39, at 299; Anthony Ricciardi & Daniel Simberloff, 
Assisted Colonization Is Not a Viable Conservation Strategy, 24 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 
248, 251 (2009). 
 42. One such cost is the welfare of organisms throughout the revival process, as well as the risks 
of harm to revived organisms that are introduced. Sherkow & Greely, supra note 17, at 32. 
 43. Some studies have found that only five to twenty percent of planned introductions result in 
the successful establishment of a population of the introduced species. See Mark Williamson & 
Alastair Fitter, The Varying Success of Invaders, 77 ECOLOGY 1661, 1662 (1996). Others have found a 
success rate of about fifty percent. See Jonathan M. Jeschke & David L. Strayer, Invasion Success of 
Vertebrates in Europe and North America, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7198, 7198 (2005); M. Jake 
Vander Zanden, The Success of Animal Invaders, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7055, 7055–56 (2005). 
 44. See generally Jeff McNeely, Invasive Species: A Costly Catastrophe for Native Biodiversity, 
LAND USE & WATER RESOURCES RES., 2001; INVASIVE SPECIES IN A CHANGING WORLD (H.A. 
Mooney & R.J. Hobbs eds., 2000). 
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movement as an adaptation strategy for managing the effects of climate 
change.
45
 The history of natural resources management is rife with 
notorious examples of non-native introductions—some even intended to 
minimize other human effects on ecological resources—that nonetheless 
led to extensive unintended ecological harm to receiving areas.
46
 As such, 
introductions risk disrupting receiving biological communities and, rather 
than increase biodiversity or ecological function, may serve to decrease 
it.
47
 In particular, the intentional introduction of a revived species into a 
biotic community of which it was never a constituent might be regarded as 
necessarily a degradation of native biotic communities and natural 
ecosystems, akin to an invasive species that makes the existing community 
ostensibly less authentic. 
In addition to anticipated risks, however, are the possible unanticipated 
harms of introductions of revived species. Scholars have raised various 
uncertainties that inhibit the capacity to evaluate, anticipate, and minimize 
the harms of intentional introductions for existing species on receiving 
ecosystems.
48
 Retrospective empirical studies of circumstances in which 
certain species became invasive, while others did not, do not yield clear 
answers.
49
 Even species that were vulnerable in their native range have 
become invasive elsewhere, as “the biological traits that promote 
endangerment are not simply the opposite of those that favor 
invasiveness.”50 The uncertainties that accompany climate change are 
likely to further hinder the ability to assess and manage any introductions 
effectively.
51
 As a result, assessing the risks of planned introductions even 
 
 
 45. See Ricciardi & Simberloff, supra note 41, at 248–50. 
 46. Prominent examples are the introduction of the kudzu vine (Pueraria lobata) for erosion 
control in the southeastern United States, Specific Profiles: Kudzu, USDA NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES 
INFO. CENTER, http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/plants/kudzu.shtml (last visited July 2, 2013), 
archived at perma.cc/CMY2-E992, and the introduction in Australia of the cane toad (Bufo marinus) 
to control growth of the cane beetle (Dermolepida albohirtum). Margarita Lampo & Giulio A. De Leo, 
The Invasion Ecology of the Toad Bufo marinus: From South America to Australia, 8 ECOLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 388, 388–89 (1998). 
 47. Ricciardi & Simberloff, supra note 41, at 250. 
 48. Id. at 251. 
 49. See I.M. Parker et al., Impact: Toward a Framework for Understanding the Ecological 
Effects of Invaders, 1 BIOLOGICAL INVASIONS 3, 3 (1999). 
 50. Ricciardi & Simberloff, supra note 41, at 251. 
 51. Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law 
Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 186–87 (2010). In light of changing climate 
conditions, information on the localized effects of climate change on particular biotic communities or 
species is vital for assessing the potential benefits and risks of an introduction, yet there is considerable 
uncertainty about such effects for most ecosystems. See McLachlan et al., supra note 39, at 300–01. 
Additionally, existing climate models do not attempt to predict how an introduced species will interact 
with its new biotic community, or how that community will otherwise be altered by climate change. 
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for existing species is rife with uncertainty.
52
 Yet the uncertainties for any 
introduction of a de-extinct species are likely to be even greater than those 
for existing species. For most candidates for de-extinction, scientists 
typically have even less knowledge about the species—including its 
behavior, adaptations, and compatibility with existing biota and abiotic 
conditions—than about extant species.53 This is particularly likely to be 
the case the more time that has elapsed since a revived species has been 
extinct.  
There are also potential opportunity costs to de-extinction efforts. 
Some conservationists are concerned that already scarce research and 
management resources will be diverted from conserving endangered 
species and existing ecological systems toward more expensive, less 
proven, and possibly harmful efforts to revive extinct ones.
54
 Notably, 
certain prominent efforts for a few more charismatic endangered species 
already draw resources from less alluring and arguably more worthy 
species,
55
 and de-extinct efforts might exacerbate this trend.  
Relatedly, some raise concerns that the availability of de-extinction 
technologies might reduce the sense of urgency for preventing extinctions, 
which has served as a rare effective catalyst for regulatory efforts toward 
endangered species conservation.
56
 Those who are unsympathetic or 
hostile to conservation efforts might rely on the hope of unproven de-
extinction technologies to undermine conservation mandates. The 
availability of captive breeding of existing endangered species, for 
instance, comparably has been used to avoid or delay activities that seek to 
prevent extinctions in situ.
57
 De-extinction thus might unwittingly erode 
resources dedicated to endangered species preservation or the protection of 
existing ecological resources more generally.
58
  
 
 
See id. (explaining that there is a lack of understanding about community interactions when a range 
shift is driven primarily by climate change and the potential for invasiveness of species). 
 52. See Ricciardi & Simberloff, supra note 41, at 252. 
 53. See Sandler, supra note 17, at 356. 
 54. See id. at 358; Donlan, supra note 17, at 914. 
 55. See Benjamin M. Simon et al., Allocating Scarce Resources for Endangered Species 
Recovery, 14 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415 (1995) (examining the relationship between FWS 
spending on endangered species recovery and priority rankings assigned by the FWS, in part 
determining that the likelihood of receiving FWS recovery funding was greater for mammals, birds, 
and fish); Berta Martín-López et al., What Drives Policy Decision-Making Related to Species 
Conservation?, 142 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1370, 1370, 1376 (2009) (describing how 
government conservation funding in the United States and Spain are heavily influenced by public 
opinion of the species). 
 56. See Sandler, supra note 17, at 4–6. 
 57. See Snyder et al., supra note 40, at 344. 
 58. See Sandler, supra note 17, at 358. 
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One might reasonably anticipate that legal rules governing whether a 
species can or should be revived and introduced would be based on an 
analysis that carefully considered, or at least generally reflected, these 
potential ecological benefits and risks. Unfortunately, as detailed in Parts 
II through IV, the various laws and policies governing wildlife 
management are actually anchored in a set of dualisms that primarily seek 
to divide biological phenomena between those deemed natural and those 
deemed manmade, and/or between those labeled native and others labeled 
exotic. As demonstrated below, these dichotomies largely fail to integrate 
a coherent methodology for evaluating the various risks and benefits of 
relying on biotechnologies, like de-extinction, to advance ecological 
conservation. 
II. DUALISM IN ENDANGERED SPECIES LAWS 
International, federal and state endangered species conservation laws 
provide broad prohibitions that may be applicable to both revival activities 
and those involving potential introductions. The federal Endangered 
Species Act (ESA)
59
 is jointly administered by the Secretary of the Interior 
through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Secretary of 
Commerce through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), with 
the FWS managing terrestrial and freshwater species and the NMFS 
managing marine species.
60
 The ESA prohibits the harm, transport, or sale 
of listed species absent a permit.
61
 Most notably, the ESA prohibits any 
“take” of a listed fish or wildlife species,62 defined very broadly to include 
 
 
 59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 60. See id. § 1532(15) (defining “Secretary”); Id. § 1533(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 424.01 (2005) 
(FWS/NMFS joint regulations implementing the ESA). 
 61. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).  
 62. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Endangered plants would be subject to fewer restrictions, but 
nonetheless regulated. For listed plants, the ESA makes it unlawful to (1) import or export, or engage 
in interstate or foreign commerce; (2) “remove and reduce to possession . . . [or] maliciously damage 
or destroy,” any plant on federal land; or (3) “remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy” any listed 
plant, if in knowing violation of any state law. Id. § 1538(a)(2). Accordingly, if a de-extinct plant 
remains on non-federal land, the ESA likely will not limit the activity that can be undertaken unless 
state law provides restrictions. See, e.g., Charles B. McDonald, The Regulatory and Policy Context, in 
RESTORING DIVERSITY: STRATEGIES FOR REINTRODUCTION OF ENDANGERED PLANTS 87, 90 (Donald 
A. Falk, Constance I. Millar, & Margaret Olwell eds., 1996); Kevin E. Regan, The Need for a 
Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Rare Plants: Florida as a Case Study, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
125, 142 (2004). Various states do, however, provide further limits on activities pertaining to state 
and/or private lands. See, e.g., California Desert Native Plants Act, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE 
§ 80002 (2013); Linda McMahan, Comment, Legal Protection for Rare Plants, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 
515, 545–46 (1980) (noting that a number of states provide greater protection than the ESA). Iowa and 
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“harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or 
to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”63 As revival and introduction 
efforts may often involve confinement, experimentation, and harm to 
organisms, unless an exception or exemption applies,
64
 further revival and 
introduction efforts could potentially be heavily restricted. Many states
65
 
and an international treaty
66
 have adopted analogous rare species 
protection laws.  
However, as detailed in this Part, the existing ESA and its state and 
international analogues are fundamentally ill-fitted for providing a 
comprehensive framework for both revival and introduction of de-extinct 
species. This is because these laws are fundamentally premised on overly 
simplistic dichotomies between humans and nature, and between native 
and non-native, that lead to incongruous results when humans inevitably 
affect ecological processes or when ecological conditions necessarily shift. 
Current endangered species preservation laws were largely designed to 
preserve existing species in their historical and existing habitat, while 
minimizing those resources deemed to be artificial or artifactual.  
 
 
Michigan have provisions that provide a broad definition of plants, as well as automatic protections 
and prohibitions on taking for plants listed under the federal ESA. Id. at 546 n.173. 
 63. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). See also 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013). Agency regulations and courts 
have emphasized the breadth of these restrictions. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013) (defining “harm” 
to include modification or degradation of habitat that impairs “essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding or sheltering”); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 697–701 (1995). If a federal agency is involved in managing, funding, or permitting any activities 
that might affect a listed species, section 7 would require such agency to consult with the FWS, ensure 
that their activities do not jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species, and ensure that no 
adverse modification of a listed species’ critical habitat would occur. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 64. In addition to the exceptions explored more fully in this section, any individual fish or 
wildlife member of a de-extinct species that “was held in captivity or in a controlled environment” at 
the time the species was listed is exempt from the ESA’s prohibitions on import/export and any FWS 
regulations adopted pursuant to the ESA, though any continued use of the fish or wildlife may not be 
in the course of a commercial activity. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(b). All other statutory restrictions under the 
ESA would still apply. See Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & 
Barnum & Bailey Circus, 502 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109–10 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 65. Though they differ in their specifics, most state endangered species laws follow the federal 
ESA template, prohibiting taking an endangered species without a permit. See Camacho, supra note 
51, at 200. 
 66. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) provides “particularly strict regulation” for the “trade”—defined in Article I(c) as “export, re-
export, import and introduction from the sea”—of specimens of species that are “threatened with 
extinction.” Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
art. II(1), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. Such trade may be 
permitted only in exceptional circumstances. Id. Moreover, permits for import or introduction may 
only be granted if “the specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.” Id. art. III(3), 
(5). 
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When an ecological component is categorized under these laws as a 
product of human activity (e.g., experimental, exotic), it is treated as 
tainted and provided less legal protection. Various states, for example, 
expressly refuse to afford protections under their endangered species laws 
to species deemed to be exotic.
67
 Similarly, endangered species 
conservation laws focus on promoting resources primarily where they are 
deemed native, while seeking to minimize the existence of these resources 
where non-native. In short, these laws primarily seek to protect static pre-
existing environments, while ignoring the inevitability of dynamic change 
in ecological systems and the unavoidable influence of humans in these 
areas. 
Unfortunately, the prevailing focus of these regulatory regimes on 
preserving existing endangered species, minimizing human development 
(rather than active recovery of species and habitat), and preserving 
historical landscapes (or alternatively wild unmanaged land) does not map 
particularly well with the possible revival and introduction of extinct 
species. This is unsurprising, as these regulatory regimes were not 
designed with de-extinction in mind. Nonetheless, it might make the 
introduction of many revived species difficult, even if such an introduction 
were expected to have significant ecological benefits. More importantly, 
de-extinction exposes the problems with adopting these simplistic dualities 
for endangered species conservation.  
A. “Species” and a Focus on Natural 
Under the existing ESA, a species could potentially be listed as 
endangered shortly after revival. A range of issues are triggered by revival, 
however, beyond the typical scientific questions
68
 and political 
controversies raised by listing a species.
69
 In addition to peculiar questions 
regarding whether a de-extinct organism would be a “species,” any 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-296 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 379.2291 (West 
2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.584(2)(a) (West 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-331(2) (2014). 
 68. Of course, what constitutes a species is contested in the scientific community. See, e.g., 
Michael J. Donoghue, A Critique of the Biological Species Concept and Recommendations for a 
Phylogenetic Alternative, 88 BRYOLOGIST 172 (1985); Ernst Mayr, The Ontological Status of Species: 
Scientific Progress and Philosophical Terminology, 2 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 145 (1987). However, the 
category of “species” under the ESA is fundamentally a legal question, not a scientific one. 
 69. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s 
Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 401–02 (2004) (discussing legal, scientific, and 
political issues in the listing process); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition 
to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1468 (2003) (finding institutional identities of 
Congressional committee members had a more significant effect on ESA listing decisions than the 
ESA’s evidentiary requirements). 
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population of a recently revived organism defined as a species would also 
need to qualify as “endangered” under the ESA to be subject to the ESA’s 
restrictions. On the face of it, such a determination might seem 
straightforward, as there initially would only be one or a few organisms of 
its kind. However, the ESA’s fundamental reliance on native range for 
determinations of endangerment muddies the analysis.  
The ESA defines a “species” to include “any subspecies of fish or 
wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of 
vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”70 Federal law, 
as does international law,
71
 thus relies on a liberal definition of species that 
expressly treats any subspecies or distinct population segment (DPS) as a 
separately protected entity, regardless of whether it can breed with other 
population segments or not.
72
 Agency interpretations have defined a DPS 
as an “evolutionary significant unit,”73 which is further defined to have 
two necessary features—discreteness and significance.74 A de-extinct 
species would likely satisfy the discreteness condition, as the key factor is 
a separation from any other populations.
75
 All of the relevant factors for 
significance
76
 also appear to suggest a revived species would qualify: 
(1) the population’s ex situ existence undoubtedly would qualify as an 
“unusual ecological setting;” (2) if the revived population subsequently 
perished, the loss of the population would certainly “result in a significant 
gap in the range of the taxon;” (3) the de-extinct organism would be the 
 
 
 70. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012).  
 71. Internationally, CITES provides a similar definition for regulated “species” that includes 
“any species, subspecies, or geographically separate population.” CITES, supra note 66, art. I(a). 
CITES also uses the phrase “any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof” to describe a 
“specimen.” Id. art. I(b). 
 72. Cf. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4724 (Feb. 7, 1996) (“The Services do not consider it 
appropriate to require absolute reproductive isolation as a prerequisite to recognizing a distinct 
population segment.”). 
 73. Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act to Pacific 
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58612, 58618 (Nov. 20, 1991). 
 74. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4724. The Services also can consider related factors that are 
not explicitly listed in the policy. Id. at 4725. 
 75. “Discreteness” is explained as “markedly separated from other populations of the same taxon 
as a consequence of physical, physiological, ecological, or behavioral factors.” Id. at 4725. If an 
extinct organism were revived, it would be the species’ only specimen, and thus it would necessarily 
be separated from any other populations. 
 76. Determinations of whether an organism is “significant” must consider: (1) whether the 
population inhabits a “unique or unusual” setting; (2) evidence that the loss of the population would 
result in a “significant gap” in the range of a taxon; (3) whether the population represents the “only 
surviving natural occurrence of a taxon;” and (4) whether the population “differs markedly from other 
populations.” Id. 
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only surviving occurrence of its kind, though the detail of human 
involvement in its revival would likely lead to its occurrence not being 
construed as “natural;” and (4) its existence as a result of genomic 
engineering marks it as substantially different from any other populations 
that might be deemed similar. These factors all thus strongly suggest that a 
de-extinct population would be considered a DPS and a “species” under 
the ESA.
77
 
On the other hand, the fact that a de-extinct species would be, at least 
in part, an artifact of human action raises questions about the ESA’s 
applicability. Though the express text of the ESA may support protection 
for human-generated novel species, the ESA, according to some scholars, 
is implicitly embedded with an assumed human/nature dualism that such 
species are not covered and only natural species should be protected.
78
 De-
extinction, however, serves to muddle the line between natural and 
artifactual; a de-extinct species is at least partially a product of human 
action even though it previously existed in nature. One scholarly attempt 
to make sense of this dualism but provide for ESA protection of de-extinct 
species simply maintains the rigid bifurcation by essentially pushing de-
extinct species into the natural category because they “once existed in 
nature” and are planned for reintroduction “into the wild.”79 Other 
controversies in interpreting the scope of “species” under the ESA have 
similarly blurred the human/nature divide, most notably when hatchery 
fish were initially excluded from consideration by the NMFS in making 
listing determinations for steelhead salmon.
80
  
 
 
 77. See Carlin et al., supra note 11, at 21 (“[B]oth a textualist and a purposive analysis of the 
statute seem to demand inclusion of de-extinct species within its scope.”). 
 78. See id. at 22 (“The text of the statute might seem to justify ESA listing, but, in our view . . . 
the ESA was not intended to provide protection for new organisms invented by human beings ab 
initio.”). 
 79. See id. (distinguishing de-extinct species as having “once existed in nature, and that the 
proponents of de-extinction hope and expect eventually to reintroduce them into the wild,” while 
“GMOs engineered as food or pets never existed before and were never intended to be introduced and 
established in the wild, even though they may be released accidentally”). 
 80. See Interim Policy on Artificial Propagation of Pacific Salmon Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,573, 17,575 (Apr. 5, 1993) (determining that “in general, [hatchery] fish 
will not be included as part of the listed species”). NMFS subsequently reversed its approach in its 
final policy. See Policy on the Consideration of Hatchery-Origin Fish in Endangered Species Act 
Listing Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,204, 37,215 (June 28, 
2005); Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the NMFS decision to 
include hatchery fish in making listing decision for steelhead salmon). See also Andrew Long, 
Defining the “Nature” Protected by the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from Hatchery Salmon, 15 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 420 (2007). 
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B. “Endangered” and a Focus on Native Range 
Similarly, factors that the Services must consider when evaluating 
whether to list a species as “endangered” or “threatened” cut both ways for 
de-extinct species. Under the ESA, a species might be listed as endangered 
or threatened. The law defines “endangered species” to generally mean 
“any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.”81 A “threatened species” includes “any 
species which is likely to become an endangered species within the 
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”82 
The ESA’s strict protections automatically apply to all listed endangered 
species; in contrast, after listing a species as threatened, the Service adopts 
customized regulations under section 4(d) that detail which of these 
general protections apply to that particular species.
83
 
On the one hand, most (but not all) of the factors required for 
consideration of listing as endangered
84
 focus on the existence of human-
induced threats to the species or its range. For that reason, a number of 
them appear to suggest the listing of a de-extinct species as endangered 
could be appropriate. These factors include (1) the likelihood (without 
listing) of over-utilization (in light of past human over-utilization); 
(2) clear manmade factors affecting the species’ continued existence (by 
virtue of the fact that any revived organism would be “manmade” and 
fully under human possession); and (3) inadequate existing regulatory 
mechanisms absent listing (as continued existence would be left fully to 
the discretion of the possessor).
85
 Furthermore, courts have found that 
when determining whether a species is endangered, “the Secretary must 
determine that a species is exposed to the harm of no longer existing.”86 If 
only one or a few individuals exist, it is likely those individuals will be 
 
 
 81. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012).  
 82. Id. § 1532(20). 
 83. Id. § 1533(d).  
 84. The ESA requires consideration of the following factors: “(A) the present or threatened 
destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commercial, 
recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of 
existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued 
existence.” Id. § 1533(a)(1).  
 85. Courts have found that voluntary actions or actions with no “tangible requirements for 
improving habitat or reducing threats” are evidence of inadequate regulations. Greater Yellowstone 
Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1114 (D. Mont. 2009), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
665 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 86. United States v. Hill, 896 F. Supp. 1057, 1062 (D. Colo. 1995).  
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exposed to harm that could leave the species in a state of no longer 
existing. 
On the other hand, the ESA’s conception of endangerment for purposes 
of listing is fundamentally reliant on an evaluation of the species by 
reference to its historical and existing native range, making its 
applicability to de-extinct species confounding. For a species to be 
“endangered,” the ESA expressly requires it to be “in danger of extinction 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”87 However, as a 
captive laboratory population, a revived de-extinct species would have no 
discernable current (or even historical) range throughout which it could be 
considered endangered. Accordingly, this emphasis on a species’ range for 
determining whether the ESA’s prohibitions and protections apply makes 
little sense when applied to a de-extinct species. It is fairly clear that the 
ESA’s listing regime does not contemplate the revival of an extinct 
species,
88
 and the tethering of endangerment to existing range inextricably 
links value under the ESA to historical conditions and purported 
naturalness.
89
  
C. Captive-Breeding: Preferencing Exotic 
Similarly, the ESA’s captive-bred wildlife regulations90—probably the 
most directly relevant exception to the ESA’s strict prohibitions for revival 
of de-extinct listed species—are largely premised on simplistically 
dividing species between those deemed exotic and native. These 
 
 
 87. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). The statute’s listing factors also require consideration of the “present or 
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range.” Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
 88. The Services have relisted species under the ESA from extinct to endangered, which would 
be the closest analogue to listing a de-extinct species. However, they have done so only when the 
species was never extinct in the first place. For example, the long-legged thicketbird (warbler) was 
thought to be extinct until 2003 when it was rediscovered and listed as endangered. See Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule To List Six Foreign Birds as Endangered, 73 Fed. Reg. 
3146, 3179 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
 89. Though the standard listing process is elaborate and often time consuming, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1533(b)(3)–(6); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 (2013); Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and 
Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43098 (Sept. 21, 1983) (providing guidelines for ranking 
species for listing priority), the ESA does include a potentially applicable fast-track listing process if 
there is an emergency that poses a “significant risk to the well-being” of a species. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(7). See also City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that the 
only restriction on the Services when making an emergency listing decision is to not disregard 
scientific evidence that is better than the evidence relied upon in making the decision). 
 90. 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g) (2013).  
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regulations provide a federal permitting process
91
 for activities involving 
fish or wildlife that are held or bred in captivity.
92
 Among the various 
requirements, the activity must “enhance the propagation or survival” of 
the species,
93
 and the species must either be not native to the United States 
or determined to be well protected in the wild.
94
 Under such a permit, 
behavior that would normally constitute harassment nonetheless would not 
violate the ESA.
95
 As such, these regulations serve to authenticate the 
disparate treatment of captive-bred organisms that are considered a human 
artifact (and thus for which human manipulation is acceptable) from those 
wild populations that are deemed natural.
96
 Indeed, the FWS has often 
made this distinction more explicit by developing separate listing 
decisions for captive-bred populations and their wild counterparts, in 
which the restrictions on the captive populations are significantly less 
restrictive than those for wild populations.
97
 
 
 
 91. Applicants must qualify through a registration process in which the FWS must find that “the 
expertise, facilities or other resources available to the applicant appear adequate to enhance the 
propagation or survival of the affected wildlife.” Id. § 17.21(g)(3).  
 92. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(b); 50 C.F.R. §17.21(g) (allowing, provided certain conditions are met, any 
person to “take; export or re-import; deliver, receive, carry, transport or ship in interstate or foreign 
commerce, in the course of a commercial activity; or sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign 
commerce any endangered wildlife that is bred in captivity”). 
 93. 50 C.F.R. §17.21(g)(1)(ii). See also id. § 17.3 (defining “enhance the propagation or 
survival” as including certain management of populations and animal husbandry; accumulation, 
holding and transfer of wildlife; and exhibition of living wildlife for conservation education). As such, 
commercial activities unrelated to conservation, for example, would be impermissible. 
A number of states also expressly allow permits to enhance the propagation or survival of the 
species. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-961 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:1904 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 12808 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 10-2A-05(f) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 84.0895 (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-806(11) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 212-A:7 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5408 (2010). 
 94. 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g). Other conditions include that the activity does not involve interstate or 
foreign commerce with respect to non-living wildlife, and that any specimens are uniquely identified. 
Id. 
 95. Id. § 17.3 (specifically noting that the definition of “harass” does not include generally 
accepted husbandry practices, breeding procedures, or veterinary care). Similarly, under CITES, an 
animal specimen that is bred in captivity for commercial purposes, or a plant specimen artificially 
propagated for commercial purposes, that is otherwise listed as threatened is regulated as potentially 
threatened. See supra note 66, art. VII(4). 
 96. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
 97. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reclassification of Ranched Nile 
Crocodile Populations in Zimbabwe from Endangered to Threatened, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,148 (June 17, 
1987); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised 12-Month Finding to List the Upper 
Missouri River Distinct Population Segment of Arctic Grayling as Endangered or Threatened, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 54,708, 54,712–13 (Sept. 8, 2010); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to 
List the Arkansas River Basin Population of the Arkansas River Shiner (Notropis girardi) as 
Threatened, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,772 (Nov. 23, 1998); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 
Endangered Status for Chimpanzee and Pygmy Chimpanzee, 55 Fed. Reg. 9129 (Mar. 12, 1990). 
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Accordingly, the ESA’s captive-bred wildlife regulations might 
provide a potential pathway for certain genetic-engineering activities 
related to the continued propagation of a listed de-extinct species. No 
mention is made in the captive-bred wildlife regulations regarding genetic 
engineering or other genetic technologies yet. However, activities carried 
out pursuant to the captive-bred wildlife regulations certainly parallel 
those involved in the revival of extinct species. In this regard, the ESA 
does anticipate the possibility of some human management of listed 
species, which might serve as a reference for de-extinction revival 
activities. 
Nevertheless, these regulations appear to create anachronistic 
distinctions in light of the advent of de-extinction technologies. As stated 
earlier, FWS regulations provide that, in general, permits can only be 
granted for species whose natural geographic distribution is not in the 
United States.
98
 The only exception—allowing for species native to the 
United States to be captively bred—is if the FWS Director determines that 
the species is eligible because (1) there is low demand for taking wild 
populations, and (2) wild populations “are effectively protected from 
unauthorized taking as a result of the inaccessibility of their habitat to 
humans or as a result of the effectiveness of law enforcement.”99 
Accordingly, the ESA’s captive breeding program appears to require 
species to be exotic or well protected in the wild. Of course, any recently 
de-extinct species is not going to be protected in the wild, as there would 
be no wild population. As such, a revival program for native extinct 
species would be very difficult under the ESA’s existing framework for 
captive-bred wildlife.
100
  
D. Introductions: Preferencing “Natural” and “Native” 
Like those provisions governing breeding activities, the ESA’s 
provisions likely to govern the introduction of revived species into 
ecological systems rely on simplistic dualisms that make little sense in 
 
 
 98. 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(g)(1)(i). 
 99. Id. § 17.21(g)(5). The Laysan duck (Anas laysanensis) is the only native species to date ever 
granted eligibility under this provision. See id. § 17.21(g)(5)(iii); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
CAPTIVE-BRED WILDLIFE REGISTRATION UNDER THE U.S. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/factsheet-captive-bred-wildlife-and-endangered-species-
act-2012.pdf. 
 100. As these captive-bred wildlife regulations only are available for wildlife species, not plants, 
the likely avenue for cultivation of revived plants listed as endangered is through permits for scientific 
purposes or for enhancement of propagation or survival. Id. § 17.62. See infra note 130 for more 
detailed analysis of scientific permits. 
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light of de-extinction. First, these regulations create distinctions that 
disfavor introduced populations over “natural” ones. Second, in 
emphasizing historical range, these provisions heavily focus on a 
dichotomy between native and non-native. In direct contrast to the captive-
bred regulations’ primary focus on propagating exotic species, however, 
those regulating introduction heavily favor introductions of historically 
native species—regardless of the species’ compatibility with existing 
conditions. De-extinction again demonstrates the incongruity of this 
approach. 
ESA section 10(j) allows the re-introduction of any endangered animal 
or plant
101
 species through a permitting process for “experimental 
populations.”102 Importantly, this introduction program is fundamentally 
grounded in treating populations that are introduced and actively managed 
by humans differently from those that are deemed to be wild or natural. 
Section 10(j) allows “experimental population” introductions “only when, 
and at such times as, the population is wholly separate geographically 
from nonexperimental populations of the same species.”103 In addition, 
FWS regulations allow required protective management measures for 
experimental populations to include measures that isolate and/or contain 
the experimental population from natural populations.
104
 Thus, FWS 
regulations actively seek to keep wild populations distinct from 
experimental populations. FWS accordingly has engaged in active 
population segregation efforts, including capturing and controlling 
reintroduced animals to keep populations apart.
105
 
Moreover, the ESA and FWS regulations establishing this division 
include various provisions that treat experimental populations as less 
 
 
 101. If derived from non-public stock and proposed for non-federal land, an introduction of a 
listed plant may occur without a permit or listing the plant as an experimental population. See, e.g., 
Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 22 (1999) (“It has also been reported that ‘plant reintroductions are occurring regularly 
without formal listing as experimental populations.’”). 
 102. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2012). Before authorizing any release of an experimental population, 
FWS “must find that the release will further the conservation of the species.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(b). 
When making this determination, the Secretary must consider (1) “possible adverse effects on extant 
populations,” (2) “the likelihood that [the] experimental population will become established and 
survive,” (3) the potential effects of the population’s establishment on the species’ recovery, and (4) 
“the extent to which the introduced population may be affected by [other] activities within or adjacent 
to the experimental population.” Id.  
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j); 50 C.F.R. § 17.80(a). 
 104. 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(c). 
 105. See Federico Cheever, From Population Segregation to Species Zoning: The Evolution of 
Reintroduction Law Under Section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act, 1 WYO. L. REV. 287, 294 
(2001). 
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valuable. As a consequence of being designated as experimental, members 
of a species that is listed as endangered nonetheless receive significantly 
less protection than analogous wild populations.
106
 “Essential experimental 
populations,”107 and any experimental populations on a National Park or 
National Wildlife Refuge, are generally only subject to the less-stringent 
restrictions imposed on activities related to threatened species.
108
 
Nonessential experimental populations are even less protected; they 
generally are subject only to a portion of the restrictions on species 
proposed to be (but not yet) listed as threatened or endangered.
109
 In 
practice, the FWS always designates an experimental population as 
nonessential, affording them the least protection under the ESA.
110
 
The purpose of establishing this division may have been to facilitate 
reintroduction efforts “by providing assurances to those people who might 
be burdened by the reintroduction and, therefore, might oppose it.”111 
However, it nevertheless reinforces a fallacious duality between those 
biological resources that are human managed and those that are not.
112
 In 
doing so, it enshrines in the legal system an ostensibly “natural” ecological 
baseline of those conditions that existed as of the ESA’s enactment in 
1973, while treating any ecological enhancements as human artifacts and 
less valuable. Such a legal fiction can lead to illogical results when 
applied, particularly when “experimental” and “natural” populations 
intermingle.
113
 Perhaps most importantly, the segregation and discounting 
serve to frustrate the overriding goals of introduction efforts: promoting 
the acceptance of introductions, species recovery, and the ecological 
 
 
 106. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j). 
 107. FWS regulations further classify experimental populations as essential or nonessential, with 
an “essential experimental population” defined as an “experimental population whose loss would be 
likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival of the species in the wild.” 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.80(b). All other experimental populations are categorized as nonessential. Id. 
 108. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)C); 50 C.F.R. 17.83(b).  
 109. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)C)(i); 50 C.F.R. 17.83(a). 
 110. See Cheever, supra note 105, at 292 (“[FWS] . . . appl[ies] the lowest level of protection 
authorized by section 10(j)—the ‘experimental non-essential’ designation—to every formally 
reintroduced population.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Cf. Klein, supra note 25, at 1379 (“Once tainted by human intrusion, so-called ‘experimental 
populations’ lose many of the protections afforded to their wilder counterparts, creating a 
dichotomy.”). 
 113. See id. at 1379 (“[A]bsurd results might occur when reality confronts the legal fiction that 
reintroduced populations are distinct from naturally occurring populations.”). 
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health of the reserved land into which a species is introduced. As stated by 
Professor Cheever: 
This need to prevent overlap can frustrate recovery by encouraging 
wildlife managers to actively isolate experimental and naturally 
occurring populations. Preventing population interaction can 
endanger the genetic health and recovery prospects of the species. 
Second, the “wholly separate geographically” requirement can 
frustrate recovery by creating confusing regulatory variation 
concerning members of the same species, thereby aggravating any 
burden placed on humans whose activities may be affected by 
reintroduction. This not only frustrates the long-term goal of 
recovery by turning people against the protected species, but also 
frustrates the primary goal of section 10(j), facilitating acceptance 
of reintroduction among affected human populations.
114
 
In addition to this engineered duality between human managed and natural 
resources, ESA regulations on introduction create a crude duality between 
native and non-native resources by making it a key division whether or not 
an introduction is proposed within a species’ historical native range. 
Regulations promulgated by FWS give the Secretary authority to introduce 
an experimental population “outside the species’ current natural range,” 
but “within its probable historic range.”115 The only exception—allowing 
introduction outside of a species probable historical native range—is in 
“the extreme case that the primary habitat of the species has been 
unsuitably and irreversibly altered or destroyed.”116  
The FWS, when it adopted this regulation, emphasized that non-native 
introductions should be exceptionally rare.
117
 It justified this by 
highlighting the fundamental importance of the native/non-native 
distinction in the ESA, explaining that the ESA is premised on conserving 
species in native ecosystems, and expressing that the ESA’s purposes 
would be violated if the FWS regularly allowed “the introduction of listed 
species into new habitat areas as exotic species.”118 Moreover, the FWS 
 
 
 114. Cheever, supra note 105, at 291. 
 115. 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(a) (2013). 
 116. Id.  
 117. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Experimental Populations, 49 Fed. Reg. 
33,885, 33,890 (Aug. 27, 1984) (“Long-standing Service policy provides that the relocation or 
transplantation of native listed species outside their historic range will not be authorized as a 
conservation measure.”).  
 118. See id. (“[T]he purposes and policies of the Act would be violated if the Service were to 
regularly permit the introduction of listed species into new habitat areas as exotic species. Under [the 
ESA], the Service must commit itself to ecosystem protection . . . . Generally, the transplantation of 
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emphasized that other federal invasive species laws prohibit “the 
introduction of exotic, foreign species into the natural ecosystems of the 
United States.”119 Accordingly, the FWS has been very reluctant to allow 
non-native introductions, permitting only two cases since the creation of 
the ESA.
120
 Even these cases—the red wolves that were moved to Carolina 
coastal islands and the Guam rail that was introduced to the island of 
Rota—were intended to only be temporary translocations, with the FWS 
paying particular attention to reversing these incursions into non-native 
areas.
121
 Other FWS policies reinforce this emphasis on introductions only 
within historical native range. The “controlled propagation” policy,122 
which allows the use of genetic engineering techniques and introductions 
of listed species only as part of a federally approved recovery plan,
123
 also 
restricts any introductions outside the species’ “historic” native range.124 
As de-extinct species have no natural habitat and their ranges will often 
be at most unclear, their introduction raises a couple of fundamental 
problems in the application of these native/exotic dualities. First, whether 
a species would be considered native or non-native for purposes of section 
10(j) hinges on whether a revived organism would be considered the same 
or a different species from previously extinct species. As explored earlier, 
such a determination is not a straightforward proposition.
125
  
Yet the application of this provision is problematic regardless of which 
interpretation is adopted. If the de-extinct population were to be 
considered a novel species for the purposes of the ESA, then it could not 
 
 
listed species to non-native habitat abandons the statutory directive to conserve species in native 
ecosystems.”). 
 119. See id.  
 120. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 203. 
 121. See id.   
 122. Policy Regarding Controlled Propagation of Species Listed Under the Endangered Species 
Act, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,916 (Sept. 20, 2000).  
 123. See id. at 56,919–20 (stating that any “controlled propagation” activities must occur only 
when specifically provided for in an adopted recovery plan under the ESA, with a genetics 
management plan whenever practical). In addition, the FWS has stated that “intercrossing”—”[a]ny 
instance of interbreeding or genetic exchange between individuals of different species, subspecies, or 
distinct population segments of a vertebrate species”—”will not be considered for use in controlled 
propagation programs unless recommended in an approved recovery plan; supported in an approved 
genetic management plan . . . ; implemented in a scientifically controlled and approved manner; and 
undertaken to compensate for a loss of genetic viability in listed taxa that have been genetically 
isolated in the wild as a result of human activity.” Id. 
 124. See id. at 56,919 (stating activities permitted include “[p]roducing individuals for 
reintroduction to suitable habitat within the species’ historic range”); see also id. at 56,920 (stating any 
controlled propagation activities must be “[c]onducted in a manner that will prevent the escape or 
accidental introduction of individuals outside their historic range”). 
 125. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
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have an historical native range. Furthermore, FWS arguably could not 
allow introductions of the species because it would have no habitat that 
could have been irreversibly altered or destroyed. Even if the de-extinct 
population were not considered a new species—but rather sufficiently 
similar to justify being treated as part of a pre-existing species—it is 
nonetheless unclear what to use to determine the appropriate historical 
range. Under the ESA, “historic range” has typically been analyzed as the 
range of the species in the recent ecological past, typically the period 
immediately preceding industrialized human settlement.
126
 However, the 
exact historical baseline under the ESA remains ambiguous; in the context 
of section 10(j) or otherwise,
127
 FWS regulations and guidance do not 
identify any particular date for determining “historic range.”128 A pre-
industrial baseline would be consistent with the approach relied upon in 
conservation biology and other natural resource management contexts, in 
which the ecological baseline for evaluating a North American species’ 
historical range routinely has been at or before European settlement.
129
  
For any de-extinct species—whether prehistoric or extirpated more 
recently—it is unclear why a baseline of Columbus’ arrival to the Western 
hemisphere would be defensible. Particularly for the many species being 
considered for de-extinction whose extinct predecessors perished before 
 
 
 126. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Service, Reintroduction of the Mexican Wolf Within Its Historic 
Range in the Southwestern United States, Final Environmental Impact Statement 1–3, 5–106 (Nov. 
1996) (finding the probable historic range of the Mexican Wolf for identification as an experimental 
population by reference to scientific studies of range before modern settlement and late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century documentation of the species’ range). 
 127. Most of the judicial and regulatory discussion under the ESA about the concept of range 
focuses on determining whether a species qualifies as an endangered or threatened species “throughout 
all or a significant portion of its range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012) (defining “endangered species”); 
Id. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened species”). Neither the ESA nor the implementing regulations 
define “significant portion of its range.” Sherry A. Enzler & Jeremy T. Bruskotter, Contested 
Definitions of Endangered Species: The Controversy Regarding How to Interpret the Phrase “A 
Significant Portion of a Species’ Range”, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2009). The FWS has interpreted 
this as referring to current range and not historical range. See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Office of the Solicitor to Dir. of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. 7 (Mar. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-37013.pdf.  
 128. The recovery planning guidelines, upon which introductions under § 10(j) are supposed to be 
based, do include language that implies the Services should simply use the “best available 
information” when determining historic range. See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., INTERIM 
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDANCE VERSION 1.3 §§ 5.1, 6.3 
(2010). However, no period is expressly identified for evaluating such range. 
 129.  See Donlan, supra note 31, at 913 (“North American conservationists routinely turn to the 
arrival of Columbus in 1492 as a restoration benchmark.”); Stephen T. Jackson & Richard J. Hobbs, 
Ecological Restoration in the Light of Ecological History, 325 SCIENCE 567, 567 (2009) (“Restoration 
targets in the ‘New Worlds’ of the Americas, Australia, and Oceania are identified as the ‘natural’ 
states existing at the time of European discovery and conquest, that is, just before disruptions 
associated with land clearance, agriculture, grazing, and wildfire control.”). 
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European settlement, such a baseline would provide no historical range. 
More importantly, this emphasis on preserving or restoring historical 
locations of species largely ignores the more important issue of an 
introduction’s potential compatibility with the existing biotic community 
or climatic conditions. As such, de-extinction again provides a vivid 
demonstration of the limitations of existing endangered species law’s 
myopic focus on advantaging “natural” populations and preserving native, 
rather than assessing the potential benefits and risks in light of current 
ecological conditions.
130
  
III. DUALISM IN OTHER WILDLIFE AND PUBLIC LAND LAWS 
International, national, and state laws managing wildlife and public 
lands vary considerably in their particular language and scope. In the 
United States, no federal law has ever comprehensively managed the 
movement of biota. However, an array of legal provisions and definitions 
directly affect species migration and introduction, and a variety of 
governmental bodies have addressed problems that arise from non-
indigenous species.
131
 Most directly, there are many international, federal, 
and state invasive species laws that focus on prohibiting, restricting, 
and/or managing the movement of plants and animals into, out of, or 
within their jurisdictional borders. These laws vary in scope but often 
institute a permitting process for importation
132
 and/or release
133
 of certain 
 
 
 130. Another possible exception to the ESA’s restrictive prohibitions might be a permit under 
section 10(a)(1)(A) “for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected 
species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A). See also 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(a)(2) (2013) (for endangered fish or 
wildlife); id. § 17.62(b) (for introductions of listed plants on federal land). Most states also provide for 
similar permits. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2081 (West 2013); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 
§ 11-0535 (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.25 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 56:1904 (2013). These permits are typically used “to allow for scientific research on a listed species 
in order to understand better the species’ long-term survival needs.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
PERMITS FOR NATIVE SPECIES UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/permits.pdf. As such, a permit under section 
10(a)(1)(A) might better fit continued revival activities, though it might be available for introductions 
as well. However, any subsequent activities that affect populations authorized pursuant to section 
10(a)(1)(A) would still be subject to the general restrictions on the take or movement of listed species. 
As such, the FWS has only relied on this provision to allow proposed introductions in the unusual 
circumstance that such an introduction would raise little controversy. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 
204. Most efforts to introduce a population of a de-extinct species, however, are likely to be especially 
contentious. 
 131. Marc L. Miller, The Paradox of U.S. Alien Species Law, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,179, 10,179 
(2005). 
 132. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.921 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2010); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 481A.47 (West 2009). 
 133. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306; CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 3515 (West 2010) 
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species, with some regimes developing lists of prohibited species
134
 while 
others elect to generate lists of species not requiring permits.
135
 
As approximately twenty-eight percent of all the land in the United 
States is federally owned and managed,
136
 federal and other public land 
management laws also serve to significantly affect wildlife movement. 
Each of the major federal and state lands is subject to a different statutory 
regime, with each administering agency promulgating regulations and 
guidance further interpreting its authority. At the federal level, these 
include: (1) the 193 million acres of National Forests managed by the 
United States Forest Service (USFS) pursuant to the National Forest 
Management Act;
137
 (2) the nearly 248 million acres of Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) land managed under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976;
138
 (3) the national park system managed by the 
National Park Service (NPS), which includes over fifty-two million acres 
of designated National Parks
139
 managed under the National Park Service 
Organic Act;
140
 (4) approximately 89 million acres of terrestrial Federal 
Wildlife Refuges administered by the FWS pursuant to the National 
Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act;
141
 and (5) over nineteen 
million acres of land managed by the Department of Defense (DoD).
142
 
Moreover, 109 million acres of the above-listed federal lands are specially 
designated by Congress to be federal wilderness
 143
 and subject to an 
additional overlay of regulation pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964.
144
 
 
 
(“Exotic nonresident game birds may be released in this State only on prior approval of the 
commission.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-292 (2009) (requiring a permit from a commission to release 
non-indigenous wild animals or birds to stock an area for hunting). 
 134. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 220-2-.26, 220-2-.93 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-4, 27-
5-5 (2009); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4219(a) (West 2008). 
 135. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 870.10(a)–(b) (2010). 
 136. ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW 
AND DATA 3 (2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf. 
 137. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–87 (2006). The Forest Service’s Organic Administration Act of 1897, 16 
U.S.C. § 475 (2006), created the USFS, and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 528–31 (2006), broadened the use objectives of the national forests to include “outdoor recreation, 
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” Id. § 528. 
 138. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2006). 
 139. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 772 (2012), 
available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1254.pdf. 
 140. 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
 141. Id. § 668dd. 
 142. GORTE ET AL., supra note 136, at 1, 13. 
 143. See The Beginnings of the National Wilderness Preservation System, WILDERNESS.NET, 
http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=fastfacts (last visited Sept. 22, 2014), 
archived at perma.cc/34C3-K7KU. 
 144. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36. 
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These invasive species and public land management laws have much in 
common in their suppositions and goals for managing ecological systems. 
As with endangered species laws, invasive species and public land laws 
treat species’ movement—in particular, any human-aided movement—
with skepticism, to be resisted. In contrast, previously present biota and 
ecological inertia are treated as almost undeniable virtues.  
Many of these legal provisions are premised on a static, preservationist 
model of ecology that seeks to preserve species only where they exist or 
existed. Generally, the predominant motivation of this strain of wildlife 
law is to protect or promote native preexisting species, combined with 
seeking to keep exotic species from ecologically significant areas. These 
provisions draw from the prominent approach in natural resources law that 
is largely focused on a goal of historical preservation: preserving fidelity 
to historical conditions and preexisting biota, thus setting up a dualism 
between native and alien resources.
145
 
Alternatively (or at times in addition), legal regimes seeking to manage 
wildlife incorporate a focus on keeping humans separate from, and largely 
passive in their management of, these resources. The goal of such legal 
provisions is to avoid or minimize human involvement in species 
movement or the progression of reserved ecological areas. Such reserved 
lands and biota are explicitly or implicitly considered valuable in large 
part because they are deemed wild or natural, separate from humans, and 
not artificial or an artifact of human activity.
146
 Accordingly, the 
 
 
 145. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]o conserve the scenery and 
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein . . . unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.”). This preservation goal mandates that the NPS cannot approve an action if it could lead 
to the impairment of any preexisting resources or values of a national park. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK 
SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006 § 4.1 (2006) [hereinafter NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES], 
available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp2002.pdf (“[P]reserving park resources and values 
unimpaired is the core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”); id. § 4.4.1 (“The National Park 
Service will maintain as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks all plants and animals native to park 
ecosystems.”). See also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL, 601 FW 
3.6D (1992) [hereinafter FWS MANUAL], available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/manuals/ (defining 
historic conditions as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from natural 
processes that we believe, based on sound professional judgment, were present prior to substantial 
human related changes to the landscape”); id. 3.12. 
 146. See, e.g., LINDA H. GRABER, WILDERNESS AS SACRED SPACE 11 (1976); HOLMES ROLSTON, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD 238 (1988) (“If we come 
to a landscape on its own terms, sensitive to its integrity, wild is always a positive predicate.”); Eric 
Katz, Restoration and Redesign: The Ethical Significance of Human Intervention in Nature, 9 
RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 90, 92 (1991); Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static 
Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 205–06 (2010) (stating that traditional 
conservation strategies, including preserves, assume “that what nature needs most is for people to 
leave it alone”). 
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Wilderness Act of 1964
147
 and other legal provisions principally target a 
goal of natural or wildness preservation: preserving the ostensibly natural 
or wild character of reserved resources.
148
 
However, reliance on native/exotic and human/nature dichotomies for 
invasive species and public lands law and management conflicts with 
current scientific understanding, disregards the pervasive effects of 
humans on natural systems, and ultimately fails to foster the effective 
protection of ecological resources and their services.
149
 Ecological systems 
are widely understood to be dynamic and their constituents not 
immutable.
150
 Furthermore, humans increasingly interact with and shape 
virtually every ecological system throughout the globe, although the 
directness and extent of these effects vary.
151
 Perhaps more importantly, 
by cordoning off areas to be reserved for certain pre-existing resources 
(while keeping out all others), wildlife laws may impair the ecological 
function of reserved areas if conditions change and make the area 
inhospitable for the pre-existing resources. Similarly, tying determinations 
of the value of a species’ movement to whether human involvement exists 
systematically disadvantages human-aided species movement and bars 
introduction of ecological resources that may well improve ecosystem 
function.  
As further detailed in this Part, de-extinction brings these various 
incompatibilities into sharp focus. For legal provisions that emphasize 
historical preservation and the native/non-native divide, the introduction of 
 
 
 147. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36. 
 148. Id. § 1131(a). Though wilderness areas may often provide other value, the defining 
characteristic and goal of wilderness is that it is “untrammeled, . . . undeveloped Federal land retaining 
its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is 
protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions.” Id. § 1131(c). 
 149. See infra Part IV.A for a detailed discussion of the incompatibility of legal dualisms with 
ecological dynamics and inescapable human influence on ecological resources. 
 150. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of 
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122–23 (1994) (“[T]he equilibrium paradigm has 
been rejected in ecology and replaced with a complex, stochastic nonequilibrium one.”); Alejandro E. 
Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1405, 1434 (2011) (stating the equilibrium model of ecology that stresses the natural stability of 
ecosystems has been widely discredited for failing to reflect the dynamism of ecosystems). 
 151. See, e.g., MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT: 
REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 4 (1996) (“[T]he human enterprise cannot be separated 
from the natural world even in our minds because there is no such separation in nature.”); BILL 
MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (2006) (arguing that the concept of nature as a force independent 
from humankind is no longer tenable); J.B. Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem 
Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening the Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 30–31 
(2007) (arguing that “naturalness” and the “natural/unnatural dichotomy” are human constructs and 
therefore subjective). 
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a de-extinct species might be deemed permissible if initiated in a 
geographic area in which its previously extinct brethren historically 
existed, regardless of the harm it might create or its compatibility with the 
area’s conditions. Such an introduction would also be barred in areas in 
which the species never existed, regardless of its potential ecological 
benefits to the area or compatibility with existing conditions.  
Similarly, as detailed in this Part, for legal provisions that seek to 
promote wildness preservation and the human/nature dualism, any 
introduced de-extinct species would be deemed exotic because humans 
instigated its presence. A subset of such jurisdictions would only bar an 
introduced de-extinct species if the jurisdiction also concluded that the 
species would be harmful to current resources. Yet even such a standard 
would prevent introductions that (though harmful to some existing 
resources) might still provide net ecological benefit to the area. Moreover, 
for the subset of wildness preservation provisions that do not require harm 
for non-native species to be deemed invasive, any introduction of a de-
extinct species would be barred, regardless of its benefits—possibly even 
where the de-extinct species’ previously extinct brethren historically 
existed. As further explained below, continued reliance on these various 
incongruous distinctions is unlikely to promote the long-term health of 
ecological resources. 
A. De-Extinction and the Problem of “Native” 
1. Promoting “Native”  
In general, wildlife and public land laws manage biota very differently 
depending on whether an organism is native to the area in question. In 
most jurisdictions, native species benefit from a range of proactive 
measures that seek to protect, promote, and restore native ecosystems and 
natural processes. Many federal land agencies, for instance, identify their 
primary ecological goal to be sustaining and enhancing native ecological 
systems and species. The NPS has long made the core ecological aim in 
managing National Parks the protection of preexisting ecosystems and 
species,
152
 and engages in active steps to promote or restore historical 
 
 
 152. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.1 (“The National Park Service will 
maintain as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks all plants and animals native to park 
ecosystems.”). See also A. Starker Leopold et al., Wildlife Management in the National Parks, in 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
CONFERENCE 29, 29–44 (James B. Trefethen ed., 1963). 
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conditions.
153
 The DoD provides for the promotion of “native 
ecosystems.”154 Similarly, the FWS focuses its efforts in managing 
National Wildlife Refuges on the preservation and restoration of native 
ecosystems and species to “historic conditions” and the promotion of 
“natural diversity” on their lands.155 The USFS’s new planning regulations 
state that a key purpose is to “both maintain the diversity of plant and 
animal communities and the persistence of native species in the plan 
area.”156 Other USFS policies provide that active management of native 
species in national forests is acceptable to avoid extirpation of a rare or 
poorly distributed species,
157
 as is restoration of native species to 
“minimize or reverse adverse ecosystem effects caused by invasive 
species.”158 The conservation focus of these federal land provisions thus is 
not on dividing humans from nature, but on the historical preservationist 
goal of promoting or restoring native or preexisting conditions. 
Even those legal provisions that fortify a dualism between avowed 
natural conditions and human activity nevertheless tolerate some human 
intervention on behalf of native resources. As “perhaps the best legislative 
 
 
 153. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.2.5 (“In altered plant communities 
managed for a specified purpose, plantings will consist of species that are native to the park or that are 
historically appropriate for the period or event commemorated.”); id. § 4.4.2.3 (“The Service will 
survey for, protect, and strive to recover all species native to national park system units that are listed 
under the [ESA] . . . . [T]he Service will inventory other native species that are of special management 
concern to parks . . . and will manage them to maintain their natural distribution and abundance.”); id. 
§ 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types (genotypes) of native plant 
and animal populations in the parks.”). 
 154. Dep’t of Def., Developing Novel Ecosystems that Enhance Carbon Storage, Native 
Biodiversity, and Human Mobility in Lowland Hawaiian Forests, SERDP, http://www.serdp-estcp. 
org/Program-Areas/Resource-Conservation-and-Climate-Change/Climate-Change/Land-Use-and-Carbon-
Management/RC-2117 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013), archived at perma.cc/L4WK-7LHS.  
 155. See FWS MANUAL, supra note 145, at 601 FW 3.10(B)(1) (“The System’s focus is on native 
species and natural communities such as those found under historic conditions.”); id. at 601 FW 1.9(A) 
(“The overarching goal of the Refuge System is to conserve a diversity of fish, wildlife, and plants and 
their habitats . . . with a focus on native species.”); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NATIONAL WILDLIFE 
REFUGE SYSTEM MANUAL pt. 7, § 8.1 (2008) [hereinafter FWS REFUGE MANUAL]; id. pt. 7, § 12.2; 
FWS MANUAL, supra note 145, at 601 FW 3.12; id. at 701 FW 1.4(A) (“Natural Diversity: The 
number and relative abundance of indigenous species which would occur without the interference of 
man. . . . The attainment of natural diversity . . . should be an underlying consideration for all habitat 
and populations management activities.”). 
 156. 36 C.F.R. § 219.9 (2012). 
 157. U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL 2070, VEGETATION ECOLOGY (2008), 
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/nativeplantmaterials/documents/FSM_2070.pdf; U.S.D.A. 
Forest Service, Huron-Manistee National Forests: Working Together, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST 
SERV., http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/hmnf/workingtogether/?cid=STELPRDB5143170 (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2013), archived at perma.cc/C3BJ-KUZD.  
 158. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., NATIONAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR INVASIVE 
SPECIES MANAGEMENT 11 (2013), available at www.fs.fed.us/publications/invasive/invasive-
framework-2013.pdf. 
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manifestation of the impulse to divide the world into the mutually 
exclusive spheres of nature and culture,”159 the Wilderness Act generally 
subjects native species on the 109 million acres of lands designated as 
federal wilderness
160
 to minimal management activities.
161
 Nonetheless, 
some agency regulations governing federal Wilderness areas specifically 
allow the restoration of native populations and natural processes to reverse 
human manipulation.
162
 Similarly, some NPS rules stipulate that active 
management of native species on non-wilderness National Parks is 
discouraged.
163
 In fact, some NPS policies conflate the human/nature and 
native/non-native dichotomies by purporting to promote native species 
through the minimization of human management.
164
 Even so, the NPS 
affirms its focus is not only on the preservation of existing natural 
resources in National Parks,
165
 but also the affirmative restoration of 
extirpated native species.
166
 Even in such areas, then, defining a species as 
native generally serves as a way to protect and promote the species.   
 
 
 159. Klein, supra note 25, at 1374. 
 160. See The Beginnings of the National Wilderness Preservation System, supra note 143. 
 161. A wilderness area must be “protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions.” 
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 
1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he Wilderness Act requires that the lands and waters duly 
designated as wilderness must be left untouched, untrammeled, and unaltered by commerce.”); High 
Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (determining 
that built river structures did not advance the Wilderness Act’s goals); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. 
Supp. 40, 42–43 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating agencies bear the burden of proof when proposing measures 
that infringe on the Wilderness Act’s wilderness values).  
 162. NPS prefers to allow wilderness to recover from “natural” disturbances without human 
manipulation, but still allows active management to reverse prior human disturbance of natural 
conditions. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.2.4 (“Landscape and vegetation 
conditions altered by human activity may be manipulated where the park management plan provides 
for restoring the lands to a natural condition.”). See also id. § 6.3.7; U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 1745.06(H) (1992) [hereinafter BLM MANUAL] (“In 
designated wilderness areas, native and naturalized species may be augmented or reestablished to: 1) 
perpetuate and enhance recovery of a listed Threatened or Endangered species, and thus prevent 
extinction; or, 2) restore a population of indigenous species reduced or eliminated by human 
influence.”). 
 163. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.2 (“Whenever possible, natural 
processes will be relied upon to maintain native plant and animal species and influence natural 
fluctuations in populations of these species.”). 
 164. See id. § 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types 
(genotypes) of native plant and animal populations in the parks by perpetuating natural evolutionary 
processes and minimizing human interference with evolving genetic diversity.”). 
 165. See id. § 4.1 (“[P]reserving park resources and values unimpaired is the core or primary 
responsibility of NPS managers.”). 
 166. See id. § 4.4.2.2 (“Service will strive to restore extirpated native plant and animal species 
. . . .”). 
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2. De-Extinction with “Native” as Pre-existing  
Application of existing rules and policies defining “native” and/or 
exotic to de-extinct species, however, fails to even faintly track the 
potential risks and benefits of introduction. Various authorities define 
native/indigenous (and thus preferred) species as those species that were 
present historically and non-native/nonindigenous (and thus controlled) as 
those that were not. For example, the federal National Invasive Species 
Act of 1996, which seeks to prevent the unintentional introduction and 
dispersal of nonindigenous species into the United States, defines 
“nonindigenous species” as “any species or other viable biological 
material that enters an ecosystem beyond its historic range, including any 
such organism transferred from one country into another.”167 Similarly, the 
FWS classifies “indigenous” species as those “[o]riginating in and being 
produced, growing, or living in a particular region or environment.”168 For 
these provisions, the critical question appears to be whether the species 
originated in the area. Such an approach is congruent with other public 
lands provisions that direct land management toward the preservation and 
restoration of native ecosystems to “historic conditions.”169 These 
jurisdictions thus make an essential division between those constituents 
and resources that existed before a particular historical baseline and those 
that attempt to arrive after.  
Such an historical preservationist definition of native could raise 
significant problems for the introduction of a de-extinct species. Under 
such a classification, a de-extinct organism could only be considered 
native if it previously existed in the area. As detailed earlier,
170
 it is 
possible and even likely that a de-extinct species would be considered a 
novel species. Under this historically focused definition of “native,” a de-
extinct species might not be native to any area, even if well suited to a 
particular location’s ecological conditions. Even if deemed to be the same 
as its extinct brethren, such a de-extinct species could at most be 
considered native to areas in which such extinct brethren previously 
existed, regardless of its compatibility with the current biotic communities 
or physical conditions in those or other areas.   
 
 
 167. 16 U.S.C. § 4702(11) (2012).  
 168. FWS MANUAL, supra note 145, at 701 FW 1.4B. 
 169. See, e.g., id. at 601 FW 3.12; id. at 601 FW 3.6D; Leopold et al., supra note 152, at 29. 
 170. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
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3. De-Extinction with “Native” as Natural 
A more common approach to defining a “native” species on federal and 
state lands raises even clearer difficulties for the introduction of de-extinct 
organisms. This category ties nativeness to the absence of human 
assistance or influence in a species’ migration to an area. NPS, for 
example, expressly defines a native species to include “all species that 
have occurred, now occur, or may occur as a result of natural processes on 
lands designated as units of the national park system,” while exotic species 
are defined as “those species that occupy or could occupy park lands 
directly or indirectly as the result of deliberate or accidental human 
activities.”171 Federal Executive Order 13,112, which binds all federal 
agencies (including all federal lands),
172
 defines a “native” species as 
“with respect to a particular ecosystem, a species that, other than as the 
result of an introduction, historically occurred or currently occurs in that 
ecosystem.”173 An “introduction” is defined as an “intentional or 
unintentional escape, release, dissemination, or placement of a species into 
an ecosystem as a result of human activity.”174 Some state authorities also 
follow the federal practice of defining “native” in terms of whether human 
intervention caused the species’ arrival.175  
 
 
 171. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.1.3. 
 172. Federal lands constitute twenty-eight percent of the United States land area. See GORTE ET 
AL., supra note 136. 
 173. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999). Cf. 50 C.F.R. § 15.3 (1996) 
(defining “indigenous,” for purposes of the Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. § 4903, as 
“a species that is naturally occurring, not introduced as a result of human activity, and that currently 
regularly inhabits or breeds in the 50 States or the District of Columbia”). 
 174. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. at 6183. See also BLM MANUAL, supra note 162, 
§ 1745 (defining “native species” as “with respect to a particular ecosystem, a species that, other than 
as a result of an introduction, historically occurred or currently occurs in that ecosystem”); 36 C.F.R. 
§ 219.19 (2012) (defining species as “native” for USFS if it “was historically or is present in a 
particular ecosystem as a result of natural migratory or evolutionary processes; and not as a result of an 
accidental or deliberate introduction into that ecosystem”). Though judicial interpretations are very 
rare, at least one federal appellate court interpreted “introduction” in the invasive species context 
broadly to include not only intentional establishment but also situations where humans have indirectly 
and unintentionally caused changes to entire habitats that gave rise to the migration of species. See 
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2011) (accepting the 
allegation that the Chicago Area Waterway System’s act of unintentionally allowing non-native 
invasive Asian Carp access to migrate into the Great Lakes constituted an introduction and importation 
within the meaning of the Lacey Act, though ultimately denying injunctive relief to Great Lakes states 
in suit against the owners and operators). 
 175. See, e.g., Arizona Native Plants Law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-903(A) (1989) (defining 
“protected native plant” as “any plant or part of a plant . . . which is growing wild on state land or 
public land or on privately owned land without being propagated or cultivated by human beings and 
which is included by the director on any of the definitive lists of protected categories of protected 
native plants described in this section”) (emphasis added); ARIZ. GAME AND FISH DEP’T, ARIZONA’S 
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These provisions thus allow for the possibility that a species may be 
native even if it was never present historically, but only if it arrived 
without human assistance. Accordingly, this type of definition makes 
human intervention the key factor, establishing a dichotomy between 
human activity and “natural” movement. Under such a definition of native 
or exotic that hinges nativeness on the lack of human intervention, 
however, any de-extinct species proposed to be introduced would almost 
certainly be considered exotic. NPS in fact expressly states that 
“[g]enetically modified organisms exist solely due to human activities and 
therefore are managed as exotic species in parks.”176  
B. De-Extinct Species as “Exotic” and “Invasive” 
1. Suppressing “Exotic” and “Invasive” 
Being labelled exotic not only causes a de-extinct species to be outside 
the protection of laws that seek to promote native species, but it also 
makes them vulnerable to being labelled invasive and subject to control or 
eradication. Many jurisdictions decline any protections for species deemed 
exotic.
177
 If considered invasive, however, an organism generally also will 
be vulnerable to laws that seek to minimize, control, or eradicate its 
species in that jurisdiction. Many state
178
 and federal
179
 laws prohibit or 
restrict human-induced movement of exotic or invasive species without a 
permit. Most public land laws and policies also actively seek to impede, 
contain, or eliminate invasive species. For example, in exercising its 
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION STRATEGY: 2005–2015 (2006) (following the definitions 
from Federal Executive Order No. 13,112 for “native” and “introduction”). 
 176. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.1.3. 
 177. For example, numerous state endangered species statutes expressly refuse to afford 
protections to exotic species. See supra note 67. 
 178. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 220-2-.26, 220-2-.93 (2014) (promulgating a blacklist of 
invasive, noxious, or pest species that may not be imported into the state); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 4219(a) (West 2014) (giving the commission the power to determine what “species of fish is allowed 
in each watershed”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84D.04 (West 2014) (placing species in categories with 
varying degrees of restrictions); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 870.10(a), (b) (2010) (maintaining 
“whitelists” of birds and of aquatic species that may be imported and released without a permit, 
prohibiting importation and release of all others); OR. ADMIN. R. 635-056-0010 (2014) (creating 
prohibited, noncontrolled, and controlled categories for wildlife, where species that are not categorized 
are considered prohibited). 
 179. Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371−78 (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 42−43 (2006); Exec. Order No. 
13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999); Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701−02, 7711−21, 
7731−36, 7751−61, 7771−71, 7781−86 (2000); National Invasive Species Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 4701−15 (2012). The National Invasive Species Act of 1996, which expired in 2002, regulated 
invasive aquatic species, with a focus on ballast water as the source of introduction. Id. § 4701. 
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authority under the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act,
180
 
the FWS seeks to prevent introductions and “control” invasive species on 
National Wildlife Refuges.
181
 The USFS strives to prevent, detect, and 
control invasive species in National Forests
182
 and the DoD requires agents 
to identify and control invasive species “whenever feasible.”183 Some 
jurisdictions, such as the BLM, have established extensive eradication 
programs to not only control but also eliminate invasive species.
184
 
Though these measures vary, virtually all seek to limit or reduce the 
presence of invasive species. 
2. De-Extinction and Defining “Invasive” 
Some jurisdictions embed a requirement of harmfulness for an exotic 
species to be subject to eradication or control by government authorities. 
Federal Executive Order 13,112, for example, calls for management of 
“alien species whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic or 
environmental harm or harm to human health.”185 Other federal agency 
policies and laws differ in how harm is characterized.
186
 Under such 
definitions, a de-extinct species might be subject to invasive species 
controls if proven to be harmful, either to preexisting resources or 
identified human interests. This would presumably be the case even if the 
 
 
 180. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). 
 181. See 50 C.F.R. § 35.7 (1971).  
 182. FOREST SERV., supra note 158, at 7–11.  
 183. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 4715.03: NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION PROGRAM 
(2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471503p.pdf.  
 184. See, e.g., BLM MANUAL, supra note 162, § 1745.06(F) (“Exotic or domesticated species that 
have reverted to a feral state (‘feral species’) and that are adversely impacting native species and/or 
habitats should be controlled and/or removed, unless either their presence is authorized by State or 
Federal law, or their removal is prohibited by State or Federal law.”); Weed Management and Invasive 
Species Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/ 
wo/st/en/prog/more/weeds/blm_program.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013), archived at perma.cc/ 
7YUR-KRMR.  
 185. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999).  
 186. See, e.g., What Are Noxious and Invasive Weeds?, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF 
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/more/weeds/weed_definition.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2012), archived at perma.cc/AA5L-A76C (defining “noxious weed” as both “[a] plant that grows 
out of place and is ‘competitive, persistent, and pernicious’” as well as “any plant designated by a 
Federal, State, or county government as injurious to public health, agriculture, recreation, wildlife or 
property”); Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7702(10) (2006) (defining “noxious weed” as “any plant 
or plant product that can directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to . . . interests of agriculture, 
irrigation, navigation, the natural resources of the United States, the public health, or the environment” 
and defining “plant pest” as any living stage of, among other things, plants and animals, that can 
“directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product”); Lacey 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42(a) (2000) (prohibiting the importation or shipment of non-domesticated species 
that are considered harmful). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/5
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overall benefits to the biotic community of introducing or maintaining 
such species were considerable as compared to the harm. 
However, numerous jurisdictions provide for the use of suppression 
management strategies for any species considered exotic. Some of these 
jurisdictions make invasive synonymous with non-native or exotic, while 
others simply seek to directly control or eradicate non-native species 
(without labeling them invasive). These jurisdictions thus explicitly or 
implicitly assume that a non-native species is by default harmful. For 
example, the California State Park system defines exotic species as those 
species that “occupy or could occupy [a park] as a result of deliberate or 
accidental human activities.”187 The California State Park system’s 
resource management policies call for the Park to systematically remove 
any exotic species found in wildland settings within the park.
188
 In 
contrast, California State Parks’ laws forbid the disturbance or destruction 
of native plants and animals.
189
 Other state agencies adopt similar 
approaches.
190
 This expansive definition of invasive exists at the federal 
level as well. For example, NPS states: “Exotic species are also commonly 
referred to as non-native, alien, or invasive species. Because an exotic 
species did not evolve in concert with the species native to the place, the 
exotic species is not a natural component of the natural ecosystem at that 
place.”191  
Importantly for de-extinction, though some federal agencies following 
Federal Executive Order 13,112 may not engage in active measures to 
control an exotic species unless harmful, many of these federal land 
agencies nonetheless make the deliberate introduction of an exotic species 
on public lands impermissible. For example, federal agency regulations 
restrict or prohibit the introduction of any exotic species in federal 
 
 
 187. Exotic Species, CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, http://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_ 
id=21560 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014), archived at perma.cc/N4GY-J48R. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Rules and Regulations Summary, CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, http://www.parks. 
ca.gov/default.asp?page_id=21300 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014), archived at perma.cc/V3WR-LBWK. 
Habitat manipulation in natural preserves in the California Park System is only allowed when found to 
be necessary to preserve the species or associations that constitute the basis for the establishment of 
the preserve. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5019.71 (West 2001).  
 190. See, e.g., ARIZONA STATE PARKS POLICY AND PROCEDURES, NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT § 3(G)(8) (2009) (defining “exotics” as not native to the place where found, and 
prescribes their removal “where practicable.”). The standard turns entirely on whether a species is 
“endemic,” defined as those “native or confined to a certain region,” not whether the species is causing 
any harm. Id. 
 191. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 145, § 4.4.1.3. 
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wilderness areas.
192
 On National Wildlife Refuges, naturally extirpated 
exotics, exotic birds, or species anticipated to be invasive or cause 
detrimental effects on the receiving area are similarly not eligible for 
introduction.
193
 Likewise, BLM defines and controls “invasive plants,” 
defined as plants “introduced into an environment where they did not 
evolve.”194 Other agency regulations and plans prohibit the introduction of 
exotic species
195
 or require the control and/or elimination of exotic species 
entering their lands.
196
 These laws would thus inhibit the introduction of a 
de-extinct species anywhere it would be deemed exotic. 
C. Problems with the Native/Exotic and Artifactual/Wild Dualities 
De-extinction thus helps to demonstrate a variety of pathologies in 
natural resources management that exist due to a reliance on simplistic 
dichotomies. These dualisms create fundamentally inverse management 
regimes premised on whether a species historically existed in an area, 
and/or on whether or not humans were involved in its arrival. Under the 
various provisions that codify a native/exotic duality, exotic species are 
treated as detrimental, their introduction prohibited, and their existence 
subject to a range of management strategies that seek to control or 
eliminate their presence. This might be the case even if the species appears 
to be well suited to a particular location’s abiotic characteristics or might 
provide significant value to an existing biotic community. Because de-
 
 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2323.34c(1) (2007), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/dughtml/fsm.html (“Do not stock exotic species of fish in 
wilderness.”); id. § 2323.33a (“Reintroduce wildlife species only if the species was once indigenous to 
an area and was extirpated by human induced events.”). Cf. BLM MANUAL, supra note 162, 
§ 1745.06(J) (“On lands under wilderness review . . . [n]on-native species shall not be introduced, 
except as biological control agents.”). 
 193. FWS REFUGE MANUAL supra note 155, §§ 7-8.6(B), 8.7. Cf. FWS MANUAL, supra note 145, 
at 601 FW 3.11(C) (“Unless we determine that a species was present . . . under historic conditions, we 
will not introduce or maintain the presence of that species for the purpose of biological diversity. We 
may make exceptions. . . . In such cases, we strive to minimize unnatural effects and to restore or 
maintain natural processes and ecosystem components to the extent practicable.”) 
 194. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 186. 
 195. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 922.163 (2014) (detailing National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration policy prohibiting anyone from “introducing or releasing an exotic species of plant, 
invertebrate, fish, amphibian, or mammals” into the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary). 
 196. See, e.g., SANTA ROSA AND SAN JACINTO MOUNTAINS NAT’L MONUMENT, APPROVED 
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND RECORD OF DECISION 4 (2004), available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/ 
etc/medialib/blm/ca/pdf/pdfs/palmsprings_pdfs.Par.97624.File.dat/SRSJ-ROD-5Feb04.pdf (directing 
BLM and USFS to design plans for the elimination of non-native species); CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & 
RECREATION, MT. SAN JACINTO STATE PARK GENERAL PLAN 41 (2002), available at 
http://www.parks.ca.gov/pages/21299/files/ar_616_284.pdf (requiring the development of control and 
management plans for exotic species entering park lands). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/5
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extinct species will often be considered non-native, a de-extinct species 
that might promote ecological function in an area often will fail to qualify 
for native restoration strategies and might even be subject to suppression 
measures directed at invasive species. 
Relatedly, as a result of such a native/exotic partition, a native species 
is often treated as beneficial even if it is not compatible with existing 
climactic conditions or it caused substantial ecological or economic harm 
to the area. Under most jurisdictions, native species cannot be invasive and 
thus are not subject to the suppression measures applied to invasive 
species. Federal Executive Order 13,112, for example, provides that 
invasive species can only be non-native species “whose introduction does 
or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human 
health.”197 With few exceptions,198 agencies that categorize a species as 
native will not consider it invasive
199
 and are limited in their ability to 
actively control it,
200
 no matter how much economic loss or damage it 
caused to other species or ecological functions.
201
 Accordingly, legal 
provisions bifurcating species between native and exotic remarkably 
would deem a de-extinct species suitable not based on where it is most 
compatible with existing or future anticipated conditions—or where it 
might provide the most ecological benefit—but rather on where (if 
anywhere) it existed before, even if that location’s ecology has 
fundamentally changed. 
Legal provisions governing species movement that are premised on a 
duality between wild nature and humanity likewise delimit categories that 
make little sense in light of the budding capacity of humans to promote 
 
 
 197. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999).  
 198. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 4715.03, supra note 183, at Glossary (defining 
“invasive species” as “with respect to a particular ecosystem, any species . . . whose introduction or 
presence may cause environmental or economic harm or harm to human health”). 
 199. See, e.g., NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE: 
MANAGEMENT PLAN 2, 10 (2001), available at http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/docs/council/ 
mpfinal.pdf (requiring species to be alien or non-native to be considered an invasive species); U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., NATIONAL STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR INVASIVE 
SPECIES MANAGEMENT 7 (Lynn Starr ed., 2004), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/invasivespecies/ 
documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf (same). 
 200. See Michael P. Carey et al., Native Invaders—Challenges for Science, Management, Policy, 
and Society, 10 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 373, 377, 379 (2012) (explaining how though native 
species can cause ecological and economic harms that rival those of well-known invasive species, 
existing management and policy raise significant impediment to addressing these effects). 
 201. See, e.g., NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, INVASIVE SPECIES DEFINITION CLARIFICATION 
AND GUIDANCE WHITE PAPER 3 (2006), available at http://www.doi.gov/NISC/global/ISAC/ISAC_ 
documents/ISAC%20Definititions%20White%20Paper%20%20-%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf (“While 
non-migratory populations can cause problems, they are not considered an invasive species because 
they are native.”). 
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ecological conservation through management strategies like de-extinction. 
First, many of these laws would treat any attempt to introduce a species 
that had not previously existed in the area as dangerous or problematic—
regardless of its ability to promote ecological function for the biotic 
community. A de-extinct species that might be compatible with the 
existing ecological conditions of the area and whose introduction might be 
expected to bring substantial ecological benefits would nevertheless be 
proscribed in many jurisdictions. In contrast, such provisions would 
characterize any species movement into an area that was not the result of 
human activity as categorically acceptable, even if such a migration would 
be expected to bring substantial ecological, health, or other harms. 
Paradoxically, deliberate, strategic introductions of a de-extinct species to 
promote ecological function would be barred while unintentional, 
unplanned migration would be categorically appropriate.  
In short, in most natural resources law provisions governing species 
movement, direct human intervention in species migration through 
management strategies like de-extinction leads to an increase in regulatory 
barriers and a decrease in regulatory protection. This would remain the 
case even if such a strategy were demonstrated to promote ecological 
health. De-extinction thus shows how prevailing dichotomies in invasive 
species and public lands laws can lead to perverse results for the 
management of ecological systems. 
IV. REJECTING STRICT DUALITIES: A RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH  
Reliance on anthropocentric dualisms has a long intellectual history.
202
 
In any domain of interest, a dualism claims that “there are two 
fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles.”203 There may be 
contexts in which adherence to rigid categories can offer a fruitful 
organizing principle. For example, in the longstanding dialogue in law 
concerning reliance on rules versus standards, some contend that a strict 
rule can provide more certainty and be more efficient to administer than a 
standard that requires a more detailed, case-specific inquiry.
204
 On the 
 
 
 202. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. 1, Ch. 8, p. 23, 1256b15 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford U. 
Press 1995) (concluding that nature makes plants for animals and animals for men); IMMANUEL KANT, 
LECTURES ON ETHICS 212–13 (Cambridge U. Press 1997); Genesis 1:26.  
 203. Howard Robinson, Dualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Aug. 19, 
2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/. 
 204. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) (stating 
rules “are said to be appropriate when certainty, uniformity, stability, and security are highly valued”); 
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 76–77 (1983) 
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other hand, rules can be less effective in tailoring decisions that achieve 
regulatory goals.
205
 In this same sense, a slavish adherence to assumptions 
of dualism may ignore nuances and complexities in phenomena. It is 
particularly problematic, however, if a dualism is grounded in a fallacious 
premise, such as failing to recognize that the categorical distinctions being 
attempted are not binary but more akin to a pluralism, continuum or 
synthesis.
206
 When the law relies on such a dualism, the result may be 
ineffective or distorted regulation.
207
  
 
 
(arguing that precision and simplicity are less important and more likely to misallocate resources for 
“internal” administrative rules addressed to persons charged with the enforcement of the external 
rules); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257 (1974). For an overview of the distinction between “rules” and “standards,” see generally 
Schlag, supra (questioning the coherence of a distinction between “rules,” which draw sharp lines, and 
“standards,” which allow for flexibility). Schlag also discusses an “epistemological twist” to the 
decision between rules and standards: “standards are most appropriate when we lack knowledge or 
information about an issue.” Id. at 424. When we lack the knowledge to assess facts, standards may be 
appropriate, whereas when we lack the knowledge to assess values, rules may be more appropriate. Id. 
at 425. 
 205. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 36 (2000) (“[B]ecause rules are specified ex ante, even complex rules 
will sometimes fail to take account of all factual variations that might arise ex post which might be 
relevant to optimal tailoring of legal boundaries.”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 586–96 (1992) (challenging the assumption that standards are 
categorically more complex than rules). Schlag additionally notes that “standards are seen as more 
appropriate when flexibility, individualization, open-endedness, and dynamism are important.” Schlag, 
supra note 204, at 400.  
 206. Cf. Yeuk-Sze Lo, Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature as Subject, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 
247, 260–61 (1999) (arguing that the moral dualism between wild nature and human-restored nature is 
based on the fallacious assumption that there is an ontological dualism between independently natural 
entities and “ontologically dependent” entities). Legal dualisms can be seen, then, as a result of 
perceived ontological and moral dualisms; legal dualisms should therefore ensure that their 
foundations are accurate. See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185–86 (2007) (arguing that the dualisms between mind and body, 
and between nature and culture, are present in intellectual property law). In copyright, the “work that is 
created and owned by an author in copyright is idealized as an intangible form, which is then 
embodied or ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression.” Id. at 186. It is the “intangible form”—the 
“platonic form”—that the copyright statute defines as “work” and each fixation is just a copy of that 
form. Id. at 187–88 (“Copyright attaches to the work at the moment of fixation”). Further, Burk notes 
that “[a]mong the other troublesome dualisms identified and critiqued by feminist scholars is that 
which opposes the natural world to the results of human activity, a divide between nature and culture.” 
Id. at 194. “The failure to recognize this overlap in the law, the attempt to separate these exclusive 
categories as pristine opposites, the operation of dualistic categories of fact and artifact, signals the 
presence of an ideological agenda that bears closer scrutiny.” Id. at 199–200. 
 207. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
564–71 (2000) (arguing that the public/private distinction in governance is illusory and that the failure 
to see private and public as interdependent leads to an ineffective preoccupation in administrative law 
with the accountability of “public actors”). Cf. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 217 (1979) (describing enormous inequalities masked by the 
legal dualism between the state and civil society); Freeman, supra, at 565 (“The [Critical Legal 
Studies] project, in large part, was to reveal that seemingly natural dichotomies (public/private, 
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As revealed in Parts II and III, the application of American wildlife 
management laws pertinent to de-extinction exposes the flaws in legal 
categories centered on erroneous conceptions of nature as static and 
separable from human activity. In the full range of wildlife laws, including 
laws seeking to protect endangered species and manage invasive species 
and public lands, a consistent theme is the establishment of conceptual 
dichotomies—between natural and human-influenced, as well as native 
and exotic. Unfortunately, each of these dualities regularly leads to 
inapposite results as exemplified by an application of natural resources 
laws to the emerging biotechnologies of de-extinction. 
In U.S. wildlife management laws, an emphasis on nativity leads to 
legal categories such as “endangered,” “native,” and “exotic” that are 
erroneously premised on ecological stasis and make little sense applied to 
the management of de-extinct species. Similarly, many wildlife 
management laws emphasize an inert native/exotic duality, where exotic 
species are subject to strategies that seek to control or eliminate their 
presence while native species are treated as per se beneficial—often 
irrespective of the species’ compatibility with current conditions or its 
potential ecological value. Relatedly, under various laws, a focus on 
promoting “natural” and minimizing human influence leads to species-
management regulations that inhibit or prohibit human-directed 
propagation and movement activities—particularly into new areas—while 
accepting or promoting unassisted migration, without regard to the 
particular ecological risks or benefits of such change. As a result of these 
dichotomies, de-extinct species will often be obstructed as non-native 
and/or introduced—even if they might promote ecological function in a 
particular area—and may be allowed or promoted in locations they used to 
exist—even if likely to cause ecological damage. 
This Part suggests replacing such simplistic binary rules with 
alternatives that seek to link authorizations of potential ecosystem 
management activities such as de-extinction to a more nuanced assessment 
of the risks and benefits of the activity. This initial risk assessment should 
be combined with adaptive management protocols that require systematic 
monitoring and adjustment of emerging management strategies to 
periodically assess their efficacy in light of information obtained during 
the initial implementation process. The Part describes this adaptive risk 
 
 
state/society, contract/property) were artifacts, and that the existing order, while appearing neutral and 
natural, served some at the expense of others.”). 
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assessment framework, drawing on existing examples that might provide 
certain features of an adaptive risk analysis alternative. Finally, though the 
paper rejects the use of a strict binary approach to managing dynamic 
ecological phenomena with which humans are inextricably intertwined, it 
nonetheless also outlines how some categorizations, such as native and 
non-native, can serve a valuable role in shaping rebuttable default 
presumptions as part of a case-specific, adaptive risk assessment approach. 
A. Native/Exotic and Nature/Human as False Dichotomies 
De-extinction serves to illuminate the limitations of existing wildlife 
management laws and regulations that seek to manage the relationship of 
humans with ecosystems through adherence to dichotomies of 
natural/human and native/non-native. First, ecological systems and their 
constituents are widely acknowledged to be dynamic. In contrast to early 
versions of ecology that are premised on stationarity, “the idea that natural 
systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability,”208 today 
ecosystems are understood as not inevitably inert or in equilibrium; 
individual constituents do not stay in one place, and physical conditions 
change.
209
 Every ecosystem has been subject to disturbances such as 
floods, fire, and drought,
210
 and in fact “instability may be responsible for 
the continued existence of many species.”211 Indeed, anthropogenic 
climate change is likely to alter ecosystems in fundamental ways, 
pressuring species to adapt.
212
 Some, if not many, species will seek to 
 
 
 208. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 
573 (2008). 
 209. See, e.g., DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (1990) (stating ecologists now believe that “at the levels of populations 
and ecosystems . . . [c]hange now appears to be intrinsic and natural,” contrary to the initial views of 
ecologists who believed they could identify “highly structured, ordered, and regulated, steady-state 
ecological system[s]”); Donald Worster, Nature and the Disorder of History, in REINVENTING 
NATURE 65, 143 (Michael E. Soulé & Gary Lease eds., 1995) (“[T]he science of ecology has been 
hoist on its own petard by maintaining, as many did during the middle of this century, that natural 
communities tend toward equilibrium. Current ecological thinking argues that nature at the level of 
local biotic assemblages has never been homeostatic. Therefore, any serious attempt to define the 
original state of a community or ecosystem leads to a logical and scientific maze.”); C.S. Holling et al., 
Science, Sustainability and Resource Management, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 342, 354 (Fikret 
Berkis & Carl Folke eds., 1998) (“The linear, equilibrium-centered view of nature no longer fits the 
evidence, and is being replaced by a non-linear, multi-equilibrium view.”). 
 210. See PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 
35 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). 
 211. David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or 
Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 325 (1995). 
 212. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 179–80.  
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leave their existing ranges as climatic conditions change and move across 
landscapes to fill niches in new areas, causing new biotic assemblages to 
form.
213
 Various commenters have questioned the wisdom of relying on 
“an architecture of laws and management systems that are poorly matched 
to the challenge of managing ecosystems as complex dynamic systems.”214 
Yet preserving native ecological resources on reserved lands, while 
resisting exotic invasions, remains the fundamental model of wildlife 
management.
215
 
De-extinction demonstrates some of the problems with this approach. 
Existing laws grounded in a native/non-native duality promote 
management activities that primarily focus on maintaining or restoring 
preexisting native species, as well as inhibiting new non-native arrivals. 
Accordingly, such laws inevitably face significant impediments to their 
efficacy in advancing historical preservation as physical conditions change 
and constituents of current biotic assemblages seek to shift. More 
importantly, because they are designed to keep communities as they were 
or used to be, laws based on a strict native/non-native duality may not 
serve to promote ecological function or enhance biodiversity, but rather to 
inhibit it. Even if changing ecological conditions cause such preservation 
lands to be inhospitable to native resources, current legal native/non-native 
dualities will continue to direct managers to maintain native resources 
even at the expense of ecological function. 
 
 
 213. Id. at 181–82. 
 214. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and 
Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 196–97 (2002). See also Tarlock, supra note 150, at 1122–23 
(“The underlying ecological justification for the land ethic is the equilibrium paradigm or, as it is 
crudely and popularly called, the balance of nature. . . . Twenty-five years after this paradigm was 
incorporated into law, it—and thus the basis for the core of biodiversity protection law—is now 
unraveling. . . . [T]he equilibrium paradigm has been rejected in ecology and replaced with a complex, 
stochastic nonequilibrium one.”); Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They 
Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994) (“[C]lassical preservationist 
approaches to conservation, to the extent that they attempt to hold nature static, do not reflect realities 
of nature.”); Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in 
Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1196 (“Ecosystem management acknowledges that resource 
systems are dynamic and nonequilibrium in character, while traditional resource management has 
taken a more static and deterministic view of the landscape.”). 
 215. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 393 (2010) (“Legal regimes that formed before the dynamic 
equilibrium model was well developed, particularly conservation programs such as the ESA, the 
Wilderness Act, and the National Wildlife Refuge System, to this day depend heavily on the natural 
stability model of ecosystems and the strategy of setting aside habitat reserves to implement it. Only 
recently has the discipline of ecosystem management emerged with any concrete policy force to 
prompt movement toward the dynamic equilibrium model. This newer, more flexible conservation 
orientation, however, still depends strongly on the stationarity premise and its appeal to “natural” and 
“native” models of ecosystem dynamics.”) (citations omitted). 
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In addition to illustrating the law’s erroneous assumption of ecological 
stasis embodied in the native/exotic dualism, de-extinction exposes the 
limitations of a parallel dichotomy between nature and humanity. Laws 
proscribing active management strategies like introductions help 
institutionalize a dualism between humans and nature, treating untouched 
natural systems and undirected species migrations as intrinsically 
virtuous
216
 while resources subject to active human management are 
artifactual and thus per se of diminished value.
217
 This natural/human 
duality presumes that resource management strategies should not seek to 
actively manipulate ecological communities.
218
  
However, it is evident that nature is increasingly indivisible from 
human activity, assuming it ever was separable. Human activities 
throughout the earth have measurably large effects on every ecosystem, 
from the Arctic to the tropics, and from the highest altitude mountaintop to 
the deepest ocean trench. The substantial and widespread ecological effect 
of humanity has been discernible, and growing, for decades,
219
 most 
pervasively with anthropogenic climate change.
220
 Human activities have 
had an overwhelming effect on global ecology that continues to increase in 
scope and intensity, so much so that it is evident to at least some eminent 
scientists that “we live on a human-dominated planet.”221 With many 
 
 
 216. See Rolston, supra note 146, at 238; Michael McCloskey, Changing Views of What the 
Wilderness System is All About, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 369, 375 (1999) (“[T]he key idea of what 
wilderness is all about is to make sure that humans do not hinder the development of that ‘community 
of life,’—the flora and fauna that grow there.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 146, at 92 (“Natural individuals were not designed for a purpose. 
They lack intrinsic functions, and so they are different from human-created artifacts. . . . Depending on 
the adequacy of our technology, these restored and redesigned natural areas will appear more or less 
natural, but they will never be natural—they will be anthropocentrically designed human artifacts.”).  
 218. Some proponents of the nature/human duality have contended that active human management 
of ecological resources may be appropriate in exceptional circumstances, such as restoration to reverse 
prior human disturbance. See, e.g., Andrew Light, Ecological Restoration and the Culture of Nature, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT REALLY MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WORKS 178, 181 (David 
Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott eds., 2002). However, others still strongly criticize restoration efforts. 
See Eric Katz, The Problem of Ecological Restoration, 18 ENVTL. ETHICS 222, 222 (1996). In any 
event, even advocates of human/nature dualism who might make an exception for restoration would 
contend that resource management to promote human-centered values would be inappropriate. Light, 
supra, at 181. 
 219. See, e.g., Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthesis, 
36 BIOSCIENCE 368 (1986) (concluding that humans are appropriating a huge proportion of the 
products of photosynthesis upon which almost all ecosystems rely); Stuart Rojstaczer et al., Human 
Appropriation of Photosynthesis Products, 294 SCIENCE 2549 (2001) (providing an updated appraisal 
that concluded similarly). 
 220. Cf Robert R.M. Verchick, Steinbeck’s Holism: Science, Literature, and Environmental Law, 
22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 16–17 (2003) (stating every ecosystem has been affected by direct or indirect 
human conduct such as genetic manipulation, pollution, farming, and climate change). 
 221. See Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 SCIENCE 494, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
896 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:849 
 
 
 
 
scientists dubbing the current ecological era the “anthropocene,”222 
ecology has come to view the natural and human worlds as substantially 
interrelated.
223
 So closely intertwined have these two spheres become that 
they resemble a synthesis more than a dualism.
224
  
Establishing a rigid legal dualism between the wild and artifactual can 
lead to perverse results, as it has in the Wilderness Act.
225
 Moreover, 
whether or not human effects on the biosphere have been beneficial or 
harmful, the fact that they have been inescapable and significant certainly 
defines the reality within which conservation law and management 
decisions will have to be made for the foreseeable future. The 
nature/human legal dualism can divert attention from this more realistic 
view, and, in so doing, undermine sound conservation policy.
226
 As 
exemplified through the lens of de-extinction, making the fundamental 
ecological goal minimizing human influence on ecological resources 
necessarily obstructs active management measures (such as the 
introduction of a species) even if they were likely to improve ecological 
function. Likewise, ignoring the effects of unassisted wildlife migrations 
 
 
494 (1997) (“Human alteration of Earth is substantial and growing. Between one-third and one-half of 
the land surface has been transformed by human action; the carbon dioxide concentration in the 
atmosphere has increased by nearly 30 percent since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution; more 
atmospheric nitrogen is fixed by humanity than by all natural terrestrial sources combined; more than 
half of all accessible surface fresh water is put to use by humanity; and about one-quarter of the bird 
species on Earth have been driven to extinction.”). 
 222. See Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 415 NATURE 23 (2002); Paul J. Crutzen & 
Christian Schwägerl, Living in the Anthropocene: Toward a New Global Ethos, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan. 
24, 2011), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/living_in_the_anthropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos/2363/ 
(“It’s a pity we’re still officially living in an age called the Holocene. The Anthropocene—human 
dominance of biological, chemical and geological processes on Earth—is already an undeniable 
reality.”), archived at prima.cc/3H60-YWP8; Marion Glaser et al., New Approaches to the Analysis of 
Human-Nature Relations, in HUMAN-NATURE INTERACTIONS IN THE ANTHROPOCENE: POTENTIALS OF 
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3, 3 (2012). 
 223. See Eric W. Sanderson et al., The Human Footprint and the Last of the Wild, 52 BIOSCIENCE 
891 (2002). 
 224. See Jill M. Fraley, The Jurisprudence of Nature, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 917, 920–21 (2014) 
(asserting that the reliance on a man-nature dualism in defining nature, natural and organic in various 
regulatory areas does more harm than good because human interaction with nature exists on a more 
complicated continuum); Peter Kareiva et al., Domesticated Nature: Shaping Landscapes and 
Ecosystems for Human Welfare, 316 SCIENCE 1866 (2007). 
 225. Klein, supra note 25, at 1378 (“[T]he deliberate destruction of wild areas . . . illustrates the 
perverse, unintended consequences of legislation such as the Wilderness Act that relies upon a rigid, 
unrealistic dichotomy between nature and civilization. . . . [T]he inflexible nature-culture distinction 
employed by the Wilderness Act threatens to transform thoughtful discussions about the best use of a 
tract of land into a trivial search for roads and other indicia of a human presence that can disqualify 
federal lands from wilderness protection.”). 
 226. Cf. id. at 1337 (“As legislators have struggled to define the appropriate role of nature in a 
civilized society, they have relied perhaps overmuch upon rigid, objective boundaries between nature 
and culture as a substitute for a messy, subjective dialogue about the proper use of wild lands.”). 
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as seemingly natural, without inquiry into such a migration’s potential 
benefits and harms, raises significant risks of ecological degradation.  
Strict reliance on such a human/nature duality is particularly alarming 
in the increasingly dynamic ecological landscape likely to be wrought by 
global climate change. Absent active human management, both damaging 
unaided migrations
227
 and extinctions
228
 are expected to significantly 
increase. Existing legal dualisms of native/non-native and nature/human 
that emphasize historical conditions and averting human interaction with 
other ecological components may have made sense initially as a crude but 
effective heuristic to prevent direct human harms to precious but 
increasingly vulnerable ecological resources.
229
 Creating reserve networks 
has helped address conventional ecological stressors such as over-
exploitation and habitat loss because the harm could largely be minimized 
through segregation.
230
 Yet intentionally cordoning off lands to quarantine 
ecological resources from long-term climatic change and human activity 
was always a difficult proposition, and now increasingly problematic. 
Though certainly not without risk, the potential benefits of introductions to 
help reserved lands adapt to and flourish in changing ecological conditions 
have never been greater, and the advantages of barring such assistance 
have never been more questionable.
231
  
B. Risk-Based Adaptive Ecosystem Management 
Accordingly, sound de-extinction policy, and wildlife management 
laws in general, should reflect the dynamic and human-influenced 
character of modern ecosystems. As stated by one scholar, “[c]hange is 
 
 
 227. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 247 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) (“Climate 
change is likely to increase opportunities for invasive alien species because of their adaptability to 
disturbance.”); id. at 230–31 (“Some colonisers might ultimately need to be considered ‘invasive’ 
species . . . such as presently-restricted populations of southern shrub species that are likely to spread 
in a warmer climate”). 
 228. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 181.  
 229. See id. at 234–35. 
 230. Id.; see also Frank J. Rahel et al., Managing Aquatic Species of Conservation Concern in the 
Face of Climate Change and Invasive Species, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 551, 557 (2008) (“A 
dominant management paradigm for species of conservation concern is to isolate them in a reserve and 
hope that the species will prosper in the absence of human disturbances.”). 
 231. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 181–83, 188; Emma Marris, Moving on Assisted Migration, 
2 NATURE REP. CLIMATE CHANGE 112, 113 (2008), available at http://www.nature.com/ 
climate/2008/0809/pdf/climate.2008.86.pdf (“Humans have dominated the landscape to such an extent 
that natural dispersal cannot take place in many areas.”). 
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inevitable, and what matters is not the false choice of preservation versus 
change, but the real choice of which changes are benign and which are 
adverse.”232 Laws managing whether to encourage, allow, restrict, or 
prohibit the establishment or introduction of biota, de-extinct or otherwise, 
should focus the inquiry on whether the management strategy (as 
compared to alternative strategies) will promote ecological health in light 
of current and reasonably foreseeable ecological conditions.
233
 
1. Risk Assessment and Adaptive Management 
A sensible risk-based approach should incorporate into relevant 
wildlife management laws both (1) a provisional assessment of the risks 
and benefits for an introduction and (2) adaptive management that 
incorporates a framework for periodic monitoring and adjustment of such 
provisional decisions to account for new information and changes in 
conditions. Akin to what I and others have articulated elsewhere in the 
context of other controversial resource management strategies,
234
 a risk-
based assessment for introduction of a de-extinct speciesshould evaluate: 
(1) the administrative costs and feasibility of managing the introduction; 
(2) the potential risks of introduction to the target species; (3) the species’ 
ecological significance (including factors such as its relative rareness, 
taxonomic distinctiveness, functional uniqueness, future evolutionary 
potential, and ecological role); and (4) the potential contribution of the 
species to the ecological health of the target area, including its 
compatibility with reasonably foreseeable physical conditions at the site 
and relative ecological value of the target species to other possibly 
competitive or vulnerable biota in the target location. The assessment 
should compare these costs and benefits to those of alternative 
management strategies,
235
 such as abstention from introduction or the 
introduction of another species.
 
 
Furthermore, any permitted introduction should be required to include 
concrete measures that seek to minimize the negative and maximize the 
positive consequences of the strategy, as determined by the initial risk 
assessment. Because of the considerable uncertainty involved in such a 
 
 
 232. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 14 
(1996). 
 233. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 247. 
 234. See id. at 236–38 (discussing a possible standard for assessing assisted migration as a 
strategy for managing the effects of climate change); David M. Richardson et al., Multidimensional 
Evaluation of Managed Relocation, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9721, 9722 (2009) (same). 
 235. See Richardson et al., supra note 234, at 9724. 
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determination, such risk assessments always should be treated as 
provisional and accompanied by thorough adaptive management measures 
that mandate sustained and concrete monitoring, reexamination, and 
periodic adjustment procedures.
236
 Such a program should include 
sufficient resources and incentives for managers to reduce uncertainty and 
adjust decisions over time.
237
  
Though the FWS’s current approach to planned introductions of listed 
species under the ESA is both impermissibly dualist and incomplete, it 
encouragingly does mandate an initial assessment of some of the release’s 
costs and benefits as well as continued monitoring of the release. When 
the FWS makes its determination of whether the release of an 
experimental population “will further the conservation of the species,”238 
the FWS is directed to consider (1) “possible adverse effects on extant 
populations of [the listed] species,” (2) the likelihood that the introduced 
population will survive and become established, (3) potential effects of the 
population’s establishment on the species’ recovery, and (4) potential 
effects of other adjacent activities on the introduced population.
239
 In 
addition, any approved introduction must provide protective management 
measures for the population and periodic evaluation of the release’s 
success and its contribution to the species’ recovery.240  
While this particular approach by the FWS provides some features of a 
sensible risk assessment, it is important to point out its limitations. First, 
the regulation narrowly focuses its assessment on the harm to the listed 
species. Thus, it does not require consideration of other significant factors 
likely to affect the ecological risks and benefits of an introduction: the 
potential ecological value of the introduced species; the introduction’s 
potential effects on other species at the target site; or the compatibility of 
the introduction with existing physical conditions at the target site. The 
approach’s monitoring requirement also does not mandate concrete 
adaptive-management measures that manage the uncertainty associated 
with the introduction by requiring periodic changes in species 
 
 
 236. For an overview of the scientific literature on adaptive management, see GEORGE H. 
STANKEY, ROGER N. CLARK & BERNARD T. BORMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 31–33 (2005). 
 237. For a thorough discussion of successful use and misuse of adaptive management in 
environmental law and management, see HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, 
MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808106.  
 238. 50 C.F.R. § 17.81(b) (2013). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. § 17.81(c). 
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management based on new information or changes in conditions over 
time. Of course, most problematic is FWS’s continued linking of 
authorization of an introduction to the species’ historical native range 
(rather than its compatibility with current and projected ecological 
conditions).
241
 In contrast, some states do allow introductions of rare 
species outside their historical native range under certain conditions.
242
  
Crucially, the risk-based approach to de-extinct introductions suggested 
herein would not be premised on a duality that categorical bars 
introductions of exotic de-extinct species. Nor would it permit or 
encourage the introduction of a native de-extinct species simply because it 
previously existed in the area, or ignore migrations simply because the 
arrival lacked direct human assistance. Rather, the framework would focus 
on the value and compatibility of the de-extinct species with the receiving 
location and the relative merit of introduction as assessed against other 
possible strategies.  
As such, it makes the central inquiry determining what strategy is 
expected to maximize current and future ecosystem function or health. 
Though undoubtedly utilitarian, the inquiry proposed herein would thus 
seek to focus on promoting ecological health as the central goal, rather 
than an analysis that might emphasize broader consumptive, economic, 
aesthetic, or historical preservation considerations.
243
 This framework 
would be a significant departure from a reliance on strict dualist treatments 
of ecological resources that bifurcate management options according to 
whether or not a species is deemed native, or whether or not it is an artifact 
of human intervention.  
The most prominent regulatory approach that rejects a strict duality 
between natural and human-engineered products is embedded in the 
Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology Products 
(“Coordinated Framework”), the principal policy framework for 
synchronizing federal oversight of commercial biotechnology processes 
and products in the U.S.
244
 Under the Coordinated Framework, when a 
statute leaves an agency latitude regarding whether or not to exercise its 
 
 
 241. See supra notes 115–24 and accompanying text. 
 242. Hawaii, for example, has a statute that expressly allows for the release of certain non-native 
species. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195D-29 (LexisNexis 2013). Oregon allows the transplant of non-
native vulnerable species. OR. ADMIN. R. 603-073-0110 (2013). 
 243. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 247. 
 244. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 
1986). The Coordinated Framework was intended to harmonize and efficiently allocate the efforts of 
the various federal statutes and agencies responsible for regulating the processes and products of 
genetic engineering. Id. at 23,303. 
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authority to regulate such products or processes, determinations of 
whether to regulate must be made based on the product’s particular 
characteristics and expected environmental and health effects.
245
 The 
Coordinated Framework expressly states that such assessments (including 
decisions on whether to restrict a planned introduction of a product) 
should not be grounded in the methods used to produce them, but rather on 
the potential risks and advantages posed.
246
 Decisions on whether 
regulatory action is warranted in a particular case must be based on 
whether the risk is unreasonable, defined as “where the environmental 
benefits achieved by oversight measures to reduce the risk are greater than 
the social cost of those oversight measures.”247 In this sense, the 
Coordinated Framework similarly rejects a duality between human-
engineered and conventional or natural products. It purports to subject 
commercial biotechnology processes and products to the same regulatory 
regime as more conventional commercial processes and products, 
ostensibly focusing on the potential advantages and disadvantages of 
regulation.  
Undoubtedly, the Coordinated Framework is only limited to the 
regulation of commercial biotechnology processes and products. Even in 
this context, it has been the subject of various credible criticisms, 
including that it relies on a fragmented and inefficient regulatory 
patchwork
248
 and perpetuates yet another overly formalistic dualism 
between products and processes.
249
 Some have argued that the regulatory 
 
 
 245. Id. at 23,305. 
 246. Id.; Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned 
Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753, 6756 (Feb. 27, 
1992) (“Federal government regulatory oversight should focus on the characteristics and risks of the 
biotechnology product—not the process by which it is created. Products developed through 
biotechnology processes do not per se pose risks to human health and the environment; risk depends 
instead on the characteristics and use of individual products.”). 
 247. Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6757. 
 248. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in 
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2231–42 
(2004) (discussing Coordinated Framework’s regulatory gaps, inconsistencies, inexperience, and 
duplication); PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS & ANIMALS 10–13, 18 (2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts. 
org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/reports/foodbiotechregulation0404pdf.pdf 
(discussing Coordinated Framework issues of legal uncertainty, regulatory gaps, inconsistency, and 
lack of coordination). 
 249. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 529, 533–34 (2004) (arguing that the 
conceptual distinction conventionally made in various legal areas between product- and process-
related information is “too thin and formalistic of a conceptual device to address those policy disputes 
in a stable or satisfying manner”). 
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regime has resulted in regulatory passivity as agencies have equated 
providing similar treatment for conventional and biotechnological 
products with limited regulation,
250
 with some critics calling for a more 
precautionary regulatory approach.
251
 Finally, the regime fails to 
incorporate any of the essential adaptive management protocols proposed 
in this article that would treat initial assessments as provisional and require 
periodic evaluation and revision of decisions to promote agency learning 
over time.
252
 Even so, in a limited way the Coordinated Framework serves 
as an important example of how the valuation of a potentially risky 
activity need not turn on a binary choice but can be based rather on a more 
detailed analysis of the potential merits and risks. An approach for 
assessing and managing the revival and introduction of de-extinct 
species—or indeed novel conservation strategies more generally—could 
adopt a careful risk-based assessment centered on the particular 
characteristics and ecosystem risks of revival and introduction.
253
  
2. Potential Default Rebuttable Presumptions 
Of course, rejecting dependence on rigid categories such as native and 
exotic or natural and artificial for wildlife management leaves open the 
question of whether default presumptions in favor of unassisted or 
preexisting wildlife remain valuable. Though this risk-based adaptive 
approach rejects a reliance on rigid native-exotic dualities, whether 
members of a species currently exist or previously existed in an area 
nonetheless will frequently be very relevant to an assessment of the 
potential risks and benefits of an introduction. Past and current conditions 
are likely to be invaluable in determinations of what might advance 
 
 
 250. Mandel, supra note 248, at 2243 (“The Coordinated Framework’s conclusions that 
genetically modified products should not be regulated based on the process by which they are created, 
and that no new statutory authority is necessary to regulate them, have led regulators to believe that 
there are no new risks posed by transgenic products, and perhaps to believe that they are not 
significantly risky at all. These conclusions also have led to an agency culture of passivity in 
regulation.”). 
 251. Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 491–94 (2002). 
 252. Id. at 487–88. 
 253. It is important to note that a rejection of rigid categories such as native and exotic or natural 
and artificial for wildlife management is not inconsistent with the reliance on a precautionary 
regulatory approach. Deciding not to categorically accept unassisted migrations and reject assisted 
movement, for example, is not incompatible with a regulatory regime that presumes wildlife 
movement, in general, is barred absent sufficient evidence of safety and the adoption of appropriate 
mitigation measures. Similarly, subjecting preexisting and non-preexisting species to the equivalent 
risk assessment regime is not inconsistent with a presumption that species introductions generally are 
barred absent adequate proof of safety. 
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ecological health. For example, if a species is currently a constituent of an 
ecosystem, it is much more likely to be compatible with existing physical 
and ecological conditions. Even if a species were historically present but is 
currently not, more information is likely to be available about the species’ 
likely value to the biotic community. On the other hand, there is 
undoubtedly more uncertainty about the ecological costs and benefits of an 
introduction if an organism has never before been present in a particular 
location, such as how well suited are a location’s biotic and abiotic 
conditions to the species’ successful establishment, as well as the 
likelihood and extent of harm of an introduction to the location.  
Accordingly, such factors might give rise to rebuttable default 
presumptions in favor of native introductions. For example, a management 
rule might state that a native species is presumed compatible, or that 
introductions of that species are permitted, unless the species is assessed to 
be incompatible with current conditions.
254
 Conversely, an introduction of 
a species that is not native to an area might be barred unless assessed to be 
compatible with current conditions.  
While most legal provisions regulating wildlife management in the 
United States are grounded in promoting a strict native/non-native duality, 
a few provisions do provide useful examples of how exotic species might 
be integrated into land management regimes under a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of native species. For instance, the FWS has adopted 
a default presumption against the introduction of non-native plants on 
Federal Wildlife Refuges unless it determines there is no feasible 
alternative.
255
 The BLM similarly is considering the adoption of a policy 
that establishes a default rebuttable presumption for the introduction of 
native plants and against non-native plant species.
256
  
 
 
 254. An analogous example of a default that presumes the desirability of preexisting resources 
exists in the context of food regulation. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, for some 
food ingredients “generally recognized as safe,” there exists a default assumption of safety. E.g., 21 
U.S.C. § 346a(k)(1) (2012). Ingredients can be so designated as a result of general recognition of 
safety through substantial past history of consumption or use in food by a significant number of 
consumers. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(c), (f) (2013). Safety need not be affirmatively proven prior to the 
ingredient’s inclusion in a commercial food product. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012). However, if the Food 
and Drug Administration has grounds for believing such an ingredient may not be safe, the agency has 
the authority to institute regulatory action to overturn such status. See, e.g., United States v. An Article 
of Food, 752 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1985); Fmali Herb, Inc. v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 255. See FWS MANUAL, supra note 145, 601 FW 3.15C. The FWS also allows exotic species to 
continue to exist on Federal Wildlife Refuges only if elimination is no longer practicable or the exotic 
species has become established and maintained on a non-augmented basis for at least 25 years and 
does not conflict with refuge objectives. FWS REFUGE MANUAL, supra note 145, pt. 7, § 8.1. 
 256. The BLM has proposed a policy for plant introductions that presumes native species will be 
used unless (1) suitable native species are unavailable, (2) biological diversity of the proposed 
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A similar default rebuttable presumption could be developed that tracks 
the human/natural duality, though the argument for such a presumption is 
appreciably weaker. A regulatory framework could presume that 
ecological shifts are valuable if not the direct consequence of human 
activity. Correspondingly, it could presume that alterations to an 
ecosystem are harmful if directly the result of human action, such as an 
introduction. Such a presumption might be more appropriate in 
circumstances in which a key (but not absolute) management goal remains 
the intrinsic benefit of minimizing direct human manipulation of the 
ecological resource, regardless of its effects on ecological function.
257
 It 
also might be suitable where the harms from management interventions 
are habitually greater than the harms from inaction. 
However, in light of the pervasive influence of humans in reserved 
lands and the biosphere more generally, the intrinsic benefit of minimizing 
additional human interaction with what are already disturbed or 
“unnatural” biotic communities is more suspect.258 Moreover, the benefits 
of making inaction a default management objective are increasingly likely 
to be less favorable when considered against the costs in ecological health 
of presuming management inaction. Unfortunately, absent direct human 
intervention in protected areas, such ecological harms (including 
ecosystem degradation, loss of genetic diversity, and species extinction) 
are expected to increase for the foreseeable future as a result of global 
climate change.
259
 As climate change results in pressures for range shifts, 
the costs of inaction are likely to increase and the benefits of active 
measures (whether barring or inducing the movement of species) are likely 
to increase.
260
 
In other words, existing evidence does not support a general 
presumption either in favor of declining to regulate unassisted ecological 
shifts (especially as such changes are likely to be at least partially 
attributable to anthropogenic factors) or against active interventions such 
as introductions (particularly as species that would otherwise have 
migrated without assistance are obstructed by human-induced dispersal 
 
 
management area will not be diminished, (3) non-native species can be confined, (4) the site will not 
support native introductions, and (5) native species will not meet the resource management objective. 
BLM MANUAL, supra note 162, § 1745.06.  
 257. For example, as a tiebreaker, where all costs and benefits are equal, human inaction might be 
considered a preferred strategy to active management. 
 258. See Camacho, supra note 150, at 1432–33. 
 259. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 179–81. 
 260. See Camacho, supra note 150, at 1436. 
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barriers).
261
 Undoubtedly, there often will be substantial reasons to 
minimize human-induced effects on ecological systems, and/or to adopt 
management alternatives that are less interventionist.
262
 Though a 
presumption against active strategies might make sense in certain 
circumstances, it frequently will not be preferable to a detailed risk 
assessment that neither favors nor disfavors direct or indirect human 
interventions. 
CONCLUSION 
As with other nascent approaches to conservation policy, de-
extinction’s value remains far from clear. Though it might be a thought-
provoking strategy that galvanizes interest and hope in conservation, there 
are many reasons to question whether de-extinction of species, such as the 
Dodo, will be an effective tool for restoring or advancing ecological 
health. Even so, de-extinction should not be categorically dismissed as a 
conservation strategy based on a premise that it is inherently unnatural. 
Nor should its introduction into the environment be primarily focused on 
the resurrection of historical conditions untethered to the promotion of 
existing ecological function. Rather, de-extinction reinforces the need to 
reformulate legal frameworks for assessing new biotechnological and 
resource management strategies to make careful risk assessment and 
adaptive management their foundation. 
As an examination of their applicability to de-extinction makes clear, 
the dominant reliance in wildlife laws on dualist treatments of ecological 
resources distorts conservation management. Native/exotic dualisms 
establish ecological value primarily predicated on whether or not the 
resource previously existed in an area, while natural/human dualisms 
focus on whether or not its presence was a consequence of human 
influence. Yet the promotion of stasis and a divisible nature is increasingly 
unachievable, and attempts to do so often will be inconsistent with 
ecological productivity and health. Though nativity or human involvement 
may sometimes be quite relevant in assessing a resource’s current 
ecological value or a management strategy’s likely feasibility, neither 
should be the primary focus of conservation policy. 
 
 
 261. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 233. 
 262. These include, for example, that the administrative costs and risks of harm to the target 
species may be higher for more active strategies (such as a translocation) than less active strategies 
(such as a migration corridor). See id. at 184–85. 
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Undoubtedly, there is substantially more uncertainty in evaluating 
ecological health, and the relative value of the various current and 
potential constituents of an ecological community is quite contestable.
263
 
Reducing and managing these uncertainties, and developing processes and 
tools for assessing value, should be the primary focus of ecology, 
conservation management, and natural resources laws.
264
 By proposing a 
reorientation toward adaptive risk assessment and management, this 
Article seeks to push conservation laws to make assessments and 
deliberations about the relative value of ecological constituents the central 
enterprise. 
 
 
 263. For an exploration of the difficulties in developing standards and assessing goals in natural 
resources law untethered to historical or wildness preservation, see Alejandro E. Camacho et al., 
Perspectives: Reassessing Conservation Goals in a Changing Climate, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 
(Summer 2010), http://issues.org/wy-4/p_camacho/, archived at perma.cc/65QG-P3XE; Camacho, 
supra note 51, at 245–48. 
 264. See Camacho, supra note 51, at 254–55. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss4/5
